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CYBER DUE DILIGENCE 
ERIC TALBOT JENSEN
*




Due diligence—the notion that international law includes a duty to cease 
and remedy damage that emanates from a State’s territory—has been 
proposed as an international legal measure to temper destabilizing effects 
of harm from cyber infrastructure. Yet the extent to which States, 
particularly the United States, accept due diligence as either a principle of 
general international law or as a rule of conduct applicable to the context 
of cyberspace is not clear. This Article examines past and present U.S. 
experience with due diligence, both as a principle and rule of conduct in 
general international law. In light of U.S. foreign relations history, a trend 
toward acceptance among allies and partners, and clear utility to State 
relations in cyberspace, we argue for renewed acceptance by the United 
States of the general principle of due diligence and its specific application 
to cyber operations.  
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I. Introduction 
At present, it is difficult to characterize the United States as an enthusiast 
of either international dispute resolution or broad international legal limits 
on State behavior, such as the duty of due diligence—the notion that 
international law includes a duty to cease and remedy damage that 
emanates from a State’s territory. Yet on two occasions the United States 
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has been the beneficiary of favorable and momentous international arbitral 
awards on due diligence grounds. First, in the aftermath of the Civil War, 
an arbitral tribunal awarded the United States a significant recovery for 
damages from British failure of diligence with respect to armed ships 
provided to the Confederacy.
1
 Second, in the first half of the twentieth 
century, the United States successfully resorted to the due diligence 
principle to secure damages from Canada for transboundary pollution from 
a privately owned iron and zinc smelter near their border.
2
 Each of these 
U.S.-initiated due diligence claims inspired increasing acceptance of the 
doctrine by the larger international legal community.  
Despite past diplomatic embrace and successful results with due 
diligence, current U.S. legal policy toward the principle is uncertain. After 
extensive research, including direct questioning, a Rapporteur recently 
concluded, 
[P]rior public U.S. statements have not addressed the 
international legal status of due diligence directly. It is notable, 
however, that the United States has tended to describe any 
obligations to respond to requests for assistance in non-binding 
terms. The lack of any public U.S. endorsement of due diligence 




Still, general trends in international law support due diligence. 
Judgments by the International Court of Justice,
4
 a decision of the United 
States Supreme Court,
5
 recent studies by the International Law 
Association,
6
 and draft articles prepared by the United Nations International 
Law Commission
7
 have embraced due diligence as a general principle of 
international law. The same bodies have also recognized sector-specific 
                                                                                                             
 1. See infra Section II.A. 
 2. See infra Section II.B. 
 3. DUNCAN B. HOLLIS, IMPROVING TRANSPARENCY: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE 
CYBER OPERATIONS: FOURTH REPORT 21 (2020). 
 4. See Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9). 
 5. United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). 
 6. See DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, INT’L LAW ASS’N, STUDY GROUP ON DUE 
DILIGENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FIRST REPORT 1 (2014) [hereinafter ILA 2014 REPORT]; 
DUNCAN FRENCH & TIM STEPHENS, INT’L LAW ASS’N, STUDY GROUP ON DUE DILIGENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: SECOND REPORT 1 (2016) [hereinafter ILA 2016 REPORT].  
 7. See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n on the Work of Its Fifty-
Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 153 (2001). 
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refinements to the doctrine in the form of detailed obligations and duties 
relating to State due diligence. 
Meanwhile, due diligence has emerged as an increasingly prominent 
international legal proposal to temper highly destabilizing effects of harm 
from States’ territorial cyber infrastructure.
8
 Due diligence enthusiasts have 
advocated not mere application of the principle as a matter of default or 
general international law; they have proposed adoption of cyber-specific 
notions of due diligence that incorporate refinements derived from other 
sector-specific schemes of due diligence, such as those applicable to 
neutrality, armed conflict, the natural environment, the high seas, and even 
municipal law. Still, States, including the United States, seem hesitant to 
apply the principle to cyber activities or to incorporate wholesale the 
doctrinal nuances of regime-specific notions of due diligence. In recent 
cyber statements, the United States failed to adopt (or in most cases even 
mention) the application of due diligence to cyber activities.
9
  
This Article considers these past and present international legal policies 
with a view toward future U.S. approaches to international law due 
diligence. We begin with detailed accounts of the Alabama and Trail 
Smelter arbitrations, identifying key legal determinations made by the 
tribunals and, perhaps more significantly, by the parties themselves. We 
then outline the present state of the international law of due diligence, 
illustrating the lasting influence of the arbitrations while emphasizing the 
dual incarnations of due diligence as both a principle and as a sector-
specific rule. We then examine due diligence as applied to emerging cyber 
activities, identifying simultaneously a trend toward general acceptance of 
baseline due diligence and a host of doctrinal ambiguities ripe for resolution 
by States. We encourage the United States to reclaim its place as an 
advocate of general due diligence and to develop and publicize a policy 
toward a cyber-specific doctrine of international law due diligence. 
  
                                                                                                             
 8. David Drissel, Cyberspatial Transformations of Society: Applying Durkheimian and 
Weberian Perspectives to the Internet, 8 INT’L J. TECH., KNOWLEDGE & SOC’Y 71, 78, 81 
(2012) (describing destabilizing transformations of international society from cyber 
activities of States and non-State actors). 
 9. See, e.g., Rodney Hunter, Pol. Coordinator, U.S. Mission to the U.N., Remarks at a 
UN Security Council Arria-Formula Meeting on Cyber Attacks Against Critical 
Infrastructure (Aug. 26, 2020), https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-at-a-un-security-council-
arria-formula-meeting-on-cyber-attacks-against-critical-infrastructure-via-vtc/ (stating that 
the United States commits to “upholding the stability of cyberspace” without mentioning or 
alluding to due diligence). 
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II. Past Perspectives 
A. The Alabama Claims 
On May 13, 1861, just after its forces fired the opening salvoes of the 
American Civil War, the Southern Confederacy authorized letters of 
marque and reprisal for maritime privateers to attack and seize Union 
shipping.
10
 The same day, the British government controversially 
recognized the Confederates as a belligerency and declared neutrality in the 
conflict.
11
 After the British declaration, Confederate naval agents set out to 
commission ships from Great Britain and France to attack Union shipping 
and to challenge the North’s blockade of Southern ports.
12
 Confederate 
agents soon managed to commission ships from several British builders 
eager to cash in on the conflict. 
To dodge Great Britain’s international obligations as a neutral State, 
private British shipyards disguised the delivery destinations and the warlike 
character of the Confederate-commissioned ships.
13
 The shipbuilders gave 
                                                                                                             
 10. THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE CONFEDERATE 
STATES OF AMERICA FROM THE INSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT, FEBRUARY 8, 1861, TO ITS 
TERMINATION, FEBRUARY 18, 1862, INCLUSIVE 100 (James M. Matthews ed., 1864), 
https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/19conf/19conf.html#p100 (authorizing the Confederate 
President “to issue to private armed vessels commissions, or letters of marque and general 
reprisal, in such form as he shall think proper, under the seal of the Confederate States, 
against the vessels, goods and effects of the government of the United States”). 
 11. BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1860–1861, at 165–69 (London, William 
Ridgway 1868); see also MOUNTAGUE BERNARD, A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
NEUTRALITY OF GREAT BRITAIN DURING THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 135–36 (London, 
Longmans, Green, Reader & Dyer 1870) (reproducing the Queen’s neutrality proclamation 
in full). Classically, declarations of belligerency by States amounted to recognition that 
rebels or insurrectionists conducting hostilities had achieved a level of organization, 
violence, and control sufficient to warrant application of the international legal rights and 
obligations governing armed conflict between States. See Valentina Azarova & Ido Blum, 
Belligerency, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INT’L LAW ¶¶ 1, 2, https://opil.ouplaw.com/ 
view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e249?rskey=Hul7F2&result= 
1&prd=MPIL# (last updated Sept. 2015) (via subscription).  
 12. Tom Bingham, The Alabama Claims Arbitration, 54 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1, 3–4 
(2005) (citing JAMES D. BULLOCH, THE SECRET SERVICE OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES IN 
EUROPE: OR, HOW THE CONFEDERATE CRUISERS WERE EQUIPPED 410 (London, Richard 
Bentley 1883)). 
 13. All told, Britain converted five merchant ships to Confederate warships and built 
three warships specifically for the Confederate navy. See JP van Niekerk, The Story of the 
CSS (“Daar kom die ...”) Alabama: Some Legal Aspects of Her Visit to the Cape of Good 
Hope, and Her Influence on the Historical Development of the Law of War and Neutrality, 
International Arbitration, Salvage, and Maritime Prize, 13 FUNDAMINA 175, 177 (2007). In 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/3
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the hulls generic numerical designations or misleading foreign pseudonyms 
while under construction.
14
 They then launched the ships unarmed and 
sailed them under British colors, sending their weapons and munitions 
separately to overseas ports for final delivery to the Confederates.
15
  
Aware of these schemes and anxious to compel Great Britain to seize the 
ships, the U.S. Consul in Liverpool hired private investigators to collect 
evidence to confront the British government.
16
 The investigators easily 
detected and reported the military character of several vessels under 
construction to the U.S. Consul.
17
 Vigorous American protests and 
communications to the British Foreign Minister persuaded Great Britain to 
seize two ironclad steamships bound for the Confederate navy.
18
 Still, 
                                                                                                             
Nassau, Bahamas, where she was to be fitted with guns, a British Navy Captain ordered the 
Oreto (later renamed Florida) seized prior to delivery assessing her a warship unsuited to 
merchant service. Bingham, supra note 12, at 5. However, an admiralty judge in Nassau 
overturned the order, deeming British domestic law lacking authority for the seizure. See id. 
The Enrica, later renamed Alabama, evaded a long-delayed and belatedly issued detention 
order from the Queen’s Advocate, meeting her armaments and ammunition in the Azores. 
See id. at 6. 
 14. van Niekerk, supra note 13, at 186. The Alabama reportedly launched from its 
shipyard with “a large number of wives and well-wishers” to reinforce her disguise as a 
merchant ship. Id.  
 15. JAMES TERTIUS DEKAY, THE REBEL RAIDERS: THE ASTONISHING HISTORY OF THE 
CONFEDERACY’S SECRET NAVY 59, 71–76 (2002). A loophole in the British Foreign 
Enlistment Act of 1819 permitted British shipbuilders to construct warships for foreign 
powers at war without government consent, so long as arms were not fitted or furnished in 
the crown’s jurisdiction. Bingham, supra note 12, at 9. In 1867, a Royal Commission 
redrafted the law to close the loophole, taking effect in 1870. Id. at 10–11. 
 16. See Douglas H. Maynard, Union Efforts to Prevent the Escape of the Alabama, 41 
MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 41, 42–43 (1954). 
 17. Id.; see also BERNARD, supra note 11, at 337–38.  
 18. The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1861-1865/alabama (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). Wary of 
its prospects before Liverpool courts thought sympathetic to the Confederacy, rather than 
litigate seizure of the ironclads, the British government purchased them for service in its 
Navy. Bingham, supra note 12, at 8. A secretary to the Senior Counsel for the American side 
in the arbitration recalled the United States “beheld in England, ‘the dockyard and arsenal of 
the insurgents.’” FRANK WARREN HACKETT, REMINISCENCES OF THE GENEVA TRIBUNAL OF 
ARBITRATION, 1872: THE ALABAMA CLAIMS 21 (1911); CALEB CUSHING, THE TREATY OF 
WASHINGTON: ITS NEGOTIATION, EXECUTION, AND THE DISCUSSIONS RELATING THERETO 15 
(New York, Harper & Brothers 1873) (noting the United States believed “Great Britain and 
her Colonies had been the arsenal, the navy-yard, and the treasury of the Confederates”); 
BERNARD, supra note 11, at 371–75 (reproducing letters between the American Consul, 
Charles Adams, and British Foreign Minister, Lord Earl Russell, concerning imminent 
launch of Confederate-commissioned ships). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
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several ships built in British ports entered Confederate service during this 
period, including a swift, screw-driven sloop designated “hull number 290,” 
which the Confederates later renamed the C.S.A. Alabama.
19
 All told, 
British-supplied ships, including most infamously the Alabama, sank more 




The sinkings generated enormous U.S. hostility toward Great Britain. At 
one point, the United States alleged British support to the Confederates 
“afforded to the United States just and ample cause of war.”
21
 Along with 
British Government sympathy for the Confederacy throughout the war, the 
losses to merchant shipping stoked U.S. resentment that extended well after 
the Union’s victory in 1865.
22
 Still, on May 8, 1871, after years of intense 
diplomatic negotiations, the United States and Great Britain signed the 
                                                                                                             
 19. See The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, supra note 18; van Niekerk, supra note 13, at 
186.  
 20. The Alabama Claims, 1862-1872, supra note 18. The Alabama operated globally 
including off the coasts of Brazil, South Africa, Singapore, and Europe, sinking sixty-four 
U.S. ships. Bingham, supra note 12, at 6–7; see also HACKETT, supra note 18, at 46 (stating, 
while observing the effects of Confederate sea raids, “The commerce of the United States 
was almost totally wiped out of existence.”). To elude the raids, American shipowners 
reflagged 750 ships to foreign registry and merchants abandoned U.S. carriers for foreign 
shipping in droves. ADRIAN COOK, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS: AMERICAN POLITICS AND ANGLO-
AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1865-1872, at 15 (1975). 
 21. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 16. Having served as a General in the U.S. Army during 
the Mexican American War, Cushing was U.S. Counsel at the Alabama arbitral tribunal. 
Cushing, Caleb: 1800-1879, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY U.S. CONG., https://bioguide. 
congress.gov/search/bio/C001016 (last visited Apr. 19, 2021). 
 22. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 46–47 (noting a threat of impending war arising from 
the claims); CUSHING, supra note 18, at 15 (describing an “intense feeling of indignation 
against Great Britain” in the United States); BERNARD, supra note 11, at 493–94 n.1 
(confirming a persistent sense of injury in the United States toward Great Britain even five 
years after the war). In a notorious speech delivered in Newcastle, Prime Minister Gladstone 
argued, “We may have our own opinions about slavery; we may be for or against the South; 
but there is no doubt that Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an Army. 
They are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either—they 
have made a nation.” 1 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON 41 (Wash., Gov’t 
Printing Off. 1872) [hereinafter TREATY OF WASHINGTON PAPERS]. After the war, Gladstone 
apologized for the remarks as “an undoubted error, the most singular and palpable, I may 
add the least excusable, of them all.” HACKETT, supra note 18, at 24. A Secretary to the 
American delegation recorded “both capitals believed [the arbitration] might even decide a 
question of peace or war.” Id. at 235. But see COOK, supra note 20, at 245 (estimating no 
real danger of war erupting from the Alabama claims). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/3





 The Treaty created, inter alia, an international 




The first article of the Treaty of Washington did not bode well for British 
success. The Treaty opened with an admission of British fault, expressing 
“regret felt by Her Majesty’s Government for the escape . . . of the 
Alabama and other vessels from British ports.”
25
 It then codified the 
arbitrators’ rules for decision, also highly unfavorable to the British side.
26
 
The rules provided, in relevant part: 
 A neutral government is bound— 
 First, to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming, or 
equipping, within its jurisdiction, of any vessel which it has 
reasonable ground to believe is intended to cruise or to carry on 
war against a power with which it is at peace; and also to use 
like diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of 
any vessel intended to cruise or carry on war as above, such 
vessel having been specially adapted, in whole or in part, within 
such jurisdiction, to warlike use. 
 . . . . 
                                                                                                             
 23. The Treaty of Washington was a treaty between Great Britain and the United States 
for the “amicable settlement of all causes of difference between the two countries.” Treaty of 
Washington, Gr. Brit.-U.S., pmbl., May 8, 1871, 17 Stat. 863 [hereinafter 1871 Treaty of 
Washington]. Both sides ratified the treaty immediately, and it entered force on June 17, 
1871. Id. at 863. The treaty marked the conclusion of several rounds of failed negotiations. 
CUSHING, supra note 18, at 10. 
 24. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 864. The tribunal consisted of 
five members including one from each of the parties to the treaty. Id. Italy, Switzerland, and 
Brazil supplied the remaining arbitrators. Id.  
 25. Id. A report of the diplomatic commission that produced the Washington Treaty 
indicates the British expression of regret was received “as very satisfactory to them as a 
token of kindness.” HACKETT, supra note 18, at 67 n.1; see also CUSHING, supra note 18, at 
20 (indicating that the British Commissioners’ concession of regret stemmed from a friendly 
spirit); J.C. BANCROFT DAVIS, MR. FISH AND THE ALABAMA CLAIMS: A CHAPTER IN 
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY 148–58 (Boston & New York, Houghton, Mifflin, & Co. 1893) 
(reproducing the Protocol of Conference Between the High Commissioners on the Part of 
the United States of America and the High Commissioners on the Part of Great Britain, May 
4, 1871). 
 26. Some attribute the rules article of the treaty to the highly uncertain state of the 
relevant international law, including the law of neutrality. Elizabeth Chadwick, The British 
View of Neutrality in 1872, in NOTIONS OF NEUTRALITIES 87, 87–88 (Pascal Lottaz & 
Herbert R. Reginbogin eds., 2019). 
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 Thirdly, to exercise due diligence in its own ports and waters, 
and, as to all persons within its jurisdiction, to prevent any 
violation of the foregoing obligations and duties.
27
 
A curious caveat accompanied the Treaty’s rules clause. This stipulation 
indicated the British side did not regard the rules as “a statement of 
principles of international law which were in force at the time when the 
claims . . . arose.”
28
 Although seemingly contrary to the letter and sentiment 
of the Treaty of Washington, this savings clause resolved a persistent point 
of disagreement, reportedly rescuing the Treaty’s prospects for 
ratification.
29
 During negotiations, U.S. diplomatic representatives had 
insisted the Treaty’s rules—including the duty of due diligence—reflected 
general international law applicable at the time of the delivery of the 
ships.
30
 British negotiators ardently resisted, insisting the parties 
memorialize narrower, ad hoc legal grounds for the tribunal to resolve the 
dispute. The British preferred the tribunal avoid the question of general 
international legal duties, including due diligence. They insisted that 
existing custom and usage included no international legal obligation with 
respect to outfitting and equipping unarmed ships by a neutral State.
31
  
In fact, the Treaty of Washington reference to due diligence was not at 
all unprecedented in international law. For that matter, it was not even 
unprecedented in relations between the United States and Great Britain. In 
the 1794 Jay Treaty, the United States agreed to refer to a mixed claims 
commission demands arising from British subjects’ loss of vessels and 
cargo at the hands of private ships armed in neutral U.S. ports during Great 
                                                                                                             
 27. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 865. 
 28. Id. During negotiation of the treaty, a description of the international law principles 
applicable during the war divided the parties deeply. JOHN BASSETT MOORE, HISTORY AND 
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 
540–44 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1898) [hereinafter MOORE 1898]. 
 29. Protocol of Conference Between the High Commissioners on the Part of the United 
States of America and the High Commissioners on the Part of Great Britain (May 4, 1871), 
in DAVIS, supra note 25, at 153–55 [hereinafter Protocol of Conference]. This protocol reads 
as a legislative history or travaux préparatoires of the Treaty of Washington Conference. 
See id. 
 30. Argument of Mr. Evarts, One of the Counsel of the United States, Addressed to the 
Tribunal of Arbitration at Geneva, on the 5th and 6th August 1872, in Reply to the Special 
Argument of the Counsel of Her Britannic Majesty, in SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON 
GAZETTE: OCTOBER 4, 1872, at 4638, 4640 (London, Authority of Her Majesty 1872) 
[hereinafter Argument of Mr. Evarts] (arguing the due diligence standard was “wholly [an] 
international obligation antecedent to [the] agreement”). 
 31. Id. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/3
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Britain’s war with France.
32
 And in 1837, during a rebellion in Canada, 
insurgents hired a U.S.-flagged steamer, the Caroline, to ferry supplies 
across the Niagara River into Canada.
33
 The U.S. government had 
maintained a neutral approach toward the rebellion.
34
 After complaints of 
U.S. failure to stem the flow of supplies to the insurgents, Great Britain 
took matters into its own hands and destroyed the Caroline.
35
  
The incident generated vigorous, and now well-known, legal and 
diplomatic correspondence between the United States and Great Britain.
36
 
Although most often regarded as an exposition on the right of self-defense 
between States, the Caroline correspondence is also instructive as to due 
diligence.
37
 In fact, the Caroline incident reflects more closely a failure of 
due diligence than a case of attack giving rise to self-defense in light of the 
fact that logistical support to the Canadian rebels was not attributed to the 
United States but rather constituted private acts. In their resolution of the 
Caroline dispute, the parties agreed, “[A]ll that can be expected from either 
government in these cases is good faith, a sincere desire to preserve peace 
and do justice, [and] the use of all proper means of prevention . . . .”
38
 Thus 
at least with respect to these two episodes, the Treaty of Washington 
represented an extension, rather than innovation, of notions of due diligence 
owed between States.  
                                                                                                             
 32. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation (Jay Treaty), Britannic Majesty-U.S., 
art. VII, Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116; JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 998–99 (Washington, Gov’t Printing Off. 1906) [hereinafter MOORE 1906]. Moore 
asserts the Jay Treaty arrangement served as an example to the later Alabama arbitration. Id. 
at 999. 
 33. KENNETH R. STEVENS, BORDER DIPLOMACY: THE CAROLINE AND MCLEOD AFFAIRS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS, 1837-1842, at 12 (1989). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 919 (describing U.S. Secretary of State 
instructions to district attorneys in Northern states to abstain from involvement in the 
rebellion); see also MAURICE G. BAXTER, ONE AND INSEPARABLE: DANIEL WEBSTER AND THE 
UNION 321 (1984) (explaining President Van Buren’s strict policy of neutrality in the 
rebellion, even after the Caroline was destroyed). 
 36. Matthew Waxman, The ‘Caroline’ Affair in the Evolving International Law of Self-
Defense, LAWFARE (Aug. 28, 2018, 2:26 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/caroline-affair 
(relating historical details of the destruction of the Caroline and diplomatic and legal 
correspondence that followed). 
 37. Chadwick, supra note 26, at 92–94. 
 38. Id. at 93 (emphasis added). In response to the incident, the United States amended 
its domestic neutrality laws to better authorize federal interventions and seizures. See id. 
(citing Act of Mar. 10, 1838, ch. 31, 5 Stat. 212); see also MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 
920 (describing events leading to amendment of U.S. neutrality laws).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
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At the Alabama arbitration, Great Britain ultimately agreed to the U.S.-
proposed rules, including the recitation of due diligence. The British side 
conceded, evidently, “to evince its desire of strengthening the friendly 
relations between the two countries.”
39
 More importantly in terms of legal 
legacy, the Treaty of Washington’s due diligence obligation was not merely 
an ad hoc rule of decision. The States understood the rule, on the face of the 
treaty, to have a prospective and potentially multilateral effect as well. They 
explicitly agreed the rules of Article VI would govern their future relations 
and invited other maritime powers to accede to them.
40
 
With the Treaty in place, the Alabama arbitral tribunal met in Geneva in 
a room of the Hôtel de Ville that has since been preserved as a shrine of 
sorts to international law.
41
 Each side submitted a lengthy printed brief of 
its case and respective counter-case.
42
 Yet the most significant exchanges of 
views on due diligence actually took place later during a second merits 
stage of the arbitration. The supplemental session was arranged through 
persistent British maneuvering but facilitated in large part by Alexander 
Cockburn, the British member of the tribunal.
43
 In this supplemental 




The British side immediately seized the added session as an opportunity 
to backpedal its commitment to the Treaty of Washington. The British 
advocates contended international law, as it stood at the time of the 
American Civil War, did not prohibit State conduct “in which no active 
interference in war is imputed to a neutral State.”
45
 A lengthy British 
                                                                                                             
 39. Protocol of Conference, supra note 29, at 155. 
 40. 1871 Treaty of Washington, supra note 23, 17 Stat. at 865–66. 
 41. Hall of the Alabama, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1924, at 15 (describing the preserved 
room of arbitration). The same room had recently hosted the Society for the Succor of the 
Wounded related to the Red Cross movement. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 76–77. 
 42. The U.S. case runs to 5,442 pages, and the British case to 2,823 pages as reprinted 
by the U.S. Printing Office. See 1-6 PAPERS RELATING TO THE TREATY OF WASHINGTON—
GENEVA ARBITRATION (Wash., Gov’t Printing Off. 1872). 
 43. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 102–06, 111–13, 117–18, 121–23.  
 44. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 266–70, 292–93. Hackett was a secretary to Caleb 
Cushing, the senior U.S. counsel at the arbitration. Id. at vii. He estimates the British counsel 
had assumed their government would thwart the proceedings at an earlier stage. Id. at 266. 
When their government did not, they mustered only summary arguments which their 
member of the tribunal later arranged for them to augment in this supplementary stage. Id. at 
270. 
 45. Argument of Her Britannic Majesty’s Counsel on the Points Mentioned in the 
Resolution of the Arbitrators of July 25, 1872, in SUPPLEMENT TO THE LONDON GAZETTE: 
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supplemental brief argued neither the law of neutrality nor international 
principles of law recognized a duty of diligence in the form of omission.
46
 
Instead, to constitute breaches of due diligence and neutrality, “some act 
must have been done by, or in aid of a belligerent, for the purposes of the 
war.”
47
 Turning to the facts of the arbitration, Great Britain’s advocates 
emphasized that each ship involved in the dispute left British territory 
unarmed and in this respect was no different than other peaceful 
commercial trade by neutrals.
48
  
The British arguments faced a difficult passage from an influential 
international law treatise by former Britannic Majesty’s Advocate Robert 
Phillimore. Writing in 1871, just one year before the arbitrators met, 
Phillimore offered strong support for an international duty of due diligence 
between States. He observed, “[a] Government may by knowledge and 
sufferance, as well as by direct permission, become responsible for the acts 
of subjects whom it does not prevent from the commission of an injury to a 
foreign State.”
49
 When considering a neutral States’ duties in the delivery of 
ships, Phillimore carefully distinguished the character of specific 
obligations of conduct with respect to arms and munitions from general 
duties with respect to due diligence.
50
 Still, nothing in Phillimore’s treatise 
or reasoning significantly undermined his preceding observation that a 
general obligation of due diligence attached, even with respect to omissions 
by States. Acknowledging the relatively recent vintage of due diligence, 
and perhaps with the Treaty of Washington in mind, Phillimore reminded 
readers, “International Law is not stationary . . . [and] precedents of 
history . . . cannot be considered as decisive on the point at issue.”
51
 
The British advocates’ account of Phillimore first lodged a descriptive 
rebuttal. They characterized his treatise as legally prospective in nature—an 
observation by a publicist not assumed, even by its author, to bind 
                                                                                                             
OCTOBER 4, 1872, at 4595 (London, Authority of Her Majesty 1872) [hereinafter Majesty’s 
Counsel Argument]. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 4596. 
 49. ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW xxi (Dublin, 
Hodges, Foster, & Co., 2d ed. 1871). Elaborating later, however, Phillimore explained that 
sales of contraband goods in a State’s own territory and even their delivery are consistent 
with neutrality. Id. at xxiii (citing The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 340 
(1822)). 
 50. Id. at xxiii. 
 51. Id. at xxvii–xxviii. 
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 Second, the British argued that Phillimore’s thoughts on 
“knowledge and sufferance” were, by the usage of States, limited to the 
context of “hostile expeditions” into foreign territory.
53
 The British side 
argued that omissions by States concerning the construction and sale of 
unarmed ships of war by private shipbuilders were not included by State 
practice within Phillimore’s notion of breaches of due diligence.
54
 
Concluding, and perhaps in anticipation of losing on the question of due 
diligence generally, the British advocates emphasized that failure to prevent 
harm did not in every case amount to a failure of due diligence.
55
 A duty of 
diligence is owed to a foreign government only when “timely information 
and evidence of a legal kind” gives rise to a “reasonable ground of belief” 
that harm would result.
56
 With respect to the Confederate ships, the brief 
argued, no such duty arose nor was any such duty breached.
57
 
Predictably, the American reply moved past the question whether due 
diligence reflected a principle of international law, relying squarely on its 
incorporation into the Treaty of Washington by the parties.
58
 The Treaty, 
they insisted, definitively settled any debate on due diligence “as the law of 
this Tribunal.”
59
 The United States reemphasized that the Treaty stated the 
obligation clearly, requiring no interpretation by the tribunal, but merely 
application to the facts of the arbitration.
60
 Accordingly, the Americans 
directed the tribunal’s attention to “whether the required due diligence [had] 
been applied in the actual conduct of affairs by Great Britain.”
61
  
Like the Treaty of Washington and Phillimore’s treatise, U.S. arguments 
incorporated requirements of reasonableness and awareness or 
knowledge.
62
 The American advocates insisted a “‘reasonable ground’ . . . 
is an element of the question of due diligence always fairly to be 
                                                                                                             
 52. Majesty’s Counsel Argument, supra note 45, at 4599. 
 53. Id. at 4600. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 4623. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Argument of Mr. Evarts, supra note 30, at 4638–39. 
 59. Id. at 4639. 
 60. Id. at 4641–42. The British brief on due diligence had invoked the Swiss jurist Emer 
de Vattel’s canons of treaty interpretation to the exclusion, the American brief noted, of his 
most important, “it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation.” Id. at 
4641 (quoting without citation EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. II, ch. XVII, § 
263 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 2008) (1758)). 
 61. Id. at 4639. 
 62. Id. at 4643. 
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considered” in judging the conduct of States and the extent of their 
knowledge of harm emanating from their territory.
63
 With respect to the 
case of the British-supplied ships, the United States concluded,  
It is made the clear and absolute duty of a nation to use due 
diligence to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any 
vessel intended to cruise or carry on war against a Power with 
which it is at peace, such vessel having been specially adapted in 
whole or in part within such jurisdiction to warlike use.
64
 
One month later, the arbitrators held that Great Britain had violated its 
duty of diligence as a neutral State by a unanimous decision as to the 
Alabama and a four-to-one decision as to the C.S.A. Florida, another 
British-built Confederate cruiser.
65
 The tribunal based its legal conclusions 
on the Treaty of Washington but also cited “principles of international 
law.”
66
 Importantly, the tribunal did not attribute construction or transfer of 
the ships to the British government as acts of State.
67
 However, it found 
Great Britain had “failed, by omission, to fulfil the duties” of a neutral 
State.
68
 By permitting the Alabama and other ships to launch, to the serious 
detriment of the United States, Britain failed to exercise the duty of 
diligence owed to a belligerent State by a neutral power.
69
 Specifically, the 
tribunal observed, Great Britain failed to take “effective measures of 
prevention” regarding the ships’ deployment and later wrongfully admitted 
these ships to its colonial ports.
70
 The tribunal awarded the United States 
$15.5 million for its claims related to direct damage caused by the ships.
71
 
Although frequently regarded as a ruling on the obligations of neutral 
States during armed conflict, the Alabama arbitration also presents an early 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 4644. 
 65. Alabama Claims of the United States of America Against Great Britain (Gr. Brit. v. 
U.S.), 29 R.I.A.A. 125, 130–31 (Treaty of Wash. Arb. Trib. 1872).  
 66. Id. at 132.  
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. at 131. 
 69. See id. at 130–31. 
 70. Id. at 130. 
 71. Id. at 134. Though small in present terms, at the time of the arbitration the award 
amounted to nearly five percent of the British overall budget. Bingham, supra note 12, at 1. 
However, the tribunal rejected U.S. claims for costs incurred pursuing the ships, classifying 
them as “general expenses of the war” rather than compensable damages. Similarly, it 
rejected other indirect, or as the United States had termed them, “national” expenses such as 
lost prospective earnings due to their contingent and uncertain nature. Alabama Claims of 
the United States of America Against Great Britain, 29 R.I.A.A. at 133.  
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picture of States’ general international obligations with respect to due 
diligence. Guided by the parties’ own consensus statements of law codified 
in a treaty, the tribunal clearly framed British conduct as both a breach of 
its duty of due diligence to safeguard a State against harm emanating from 
its territory as well as a failing of neutrality. In a qualitative sense, the 
tribunal affirmed due diligence as a primary rule of conduct in international 
law. The tribunal found States owed to one another a free-standing 
obligation of due diligence that accompanied supporting legal duties in the 
then-burgeoning international legal system. The British duty of diligence 
arose both with respect to the free-standing obligations of Great Britain as a 
neutral State as well as under an independent and general duty of diligence 
to other sovereigns.  
To be sure, the tribunal left aspects of the due diligence obligation 
underdeveloped. It is unclear, for instance, whether the parties or tribunal 
would have detected or applied a generalized or free-standing obligation of 
due diligence with respect to harm that did not involve extensive physical 
destruction and massive economic loss. But a baseline obligation of due 
diligence, as a matter of general international law, was clear from both the 
Treaty of Washington and the tribunal’s decision. Moreover, rather than a 
failing or oversight, the tribunal’s decision not to develop or detect the 
lower end of a damage spectrum seems entirely appropriate in light of its 
limited adjudicative rather than legislative function.
72
 
The motives behind the parties’ legal positions during the dispute remain 
uncertain, particularly on the British side. The Treaty of Washington bears 
evidence of a certain legal magnanimity on the part of Great Britain. 
Perhaps under the facts, but almost certainly according to the law described 
in the Treaty, Great Britain was likely to lose the arbitration all along.
73
 
Chief Justice Bingham observed the arbitration was, “one of the very few 
instances in history when the world’s leading nation, in the plenitude of its 
power, has agreed to submit an issue of great national moment to the 
decision of a body in which it could be, as it was, heavily outvoted.”
74
 
                                                                                                             
 72. See Alabama Claims of the United States of America Against Great Britain, 29 
R.I.A.A. at 128–29. 
 73. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 44 (quoting 2 EDMOND FITZMAURICE, THE LIFE OF 
GRANVILLE GEORGE LEVESON GOWER SECOND EARL GRANVILLE 107 (New York, Longmans, 
Green, & Co. 1906)). Fitzmaurice observed, “A proud nation . . . consented but unwillingly 
to be dragged before an international tribunal without precedent in the history of nations, and 
under circumstance in which, on the main issue at least, the judgment was certain to be 
adverse.” FITZMAURICE, supra, at 107. 
 74. Bingham, supra note 12, at 24. 
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Prime Minister Gladstone confirmed as much, characterizing the British 
loss in the arbitration “‘as dust in the balance compared with the moral 
example set’ of two proud nations going ‘in peace and concord before a 
judicial tribunal’ rather than ‘resorting to the arbitrament of the sword.’”
75
  
Personalities, as ever, surely influenced the peaceful resolution of the 
Alabama claims as well. Reflecting later, Caleb Cushing, the U.S. Counsel 
at the arbitration, observed that replacement of the unfailingly recalcitrant 
Lord Russell by the more conciliatory Lord Stanley as British Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, as much as any factor, explained the successful negotiation 
and ratification of the Treaty of Washington.
76
 Frank Hackett, a legal 
advisor to Cushing, praised the eventual British embrace of a “more 
generous sense of international duty.”
77
  
On the American side, Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner had 
secured defeat in the U.S. Senate of a draft treaty on the Alabama claims, 
which was named the Clarendon-Johnson Treaty.
78
 His campaign against 
U.S. concessions, which included a fiery and widely published speech 
intended to stoke U.S. anger over the situation, significantly irritated Great 
Britain, served as a compelling demonstration of American resolve, and 
likely informed British concessions as well.
79
 
British legislative records also suggest a strategic motive for the British 
allowances, related to brewing turmoil in Europe. Concern for renewed war 
with Russia over Black Sea claims grew in light of France’s defeat at the 
hands of Prussia in 1871.
80
 A communication to the House of Lords 
explained the British decision to dispatch the diplomatic delegation in 1871 
to negotiate the Treaty of Washington “in view of the possibility of further 
European complications, to look at the international relations of Great 
Britain with foreign states from a new standpoint.”
81
 In late 1870, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty, Hugh Childers, had advised the Foreign Secretary 
Lord Granville, in light of potential war with Russia, “all cause of 




                                                                                                             
 75. Id. (quoting RICHARD SHANNON, GLADSTONE: HEROIC MINISTER, 1865-1898, at 114 
(1999)). 
 76. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 17–18. 
 77. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 376. 
 78. CUSHING, supra note 18, at 18, 39. 
 79. Id. at 18. 
 80. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 175–76. 
 81. Id. at 175 (quoting FITZMAURICE, supra note 73, at 81). 
 82. Id. at 176 n.1 (quoting 1 SPENCER CHILDERS, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF THE 
RIGHT HONOURABLE HUGH E. CHILDERS 173–74 (1901)). 
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A later study of the arbitration suggests economic motives for the British 
settlement as well. British financiers and banks had invested heavily in U.S. 
industry, transport, natural resources, and agriculture.
83
 Failure to peaceably 
settle the Alabama claims would have wrought severe interruptions to 
profitable trade and investments.
84
 Additionally, the possibility of U.S. debt 
cancelations weighed heavily in British diplomatic calculations.
85
 Although 
the sums involved in the arbitration were staggering at the time, war over 
the Alabama claims would not have proved economically efficient by any 
measure.
86
 These British financial interests almost certainly informed the 
government’s conciliatory instructions to its diplomatic delegation and the 




As vindication of British magnanimity (or grand strategy), the Treaty of 
Washington and the Alabama arbitration soon earned high praise both for 
their “enlightened statesmanship” toward peace as well as for their 
expositions of States’ international legal duties.
88
 The British statesman 
Viscount John Morley considered the arbitration “the most notable victory 
in the nineteenth century of the noble art of preventive diplomacy.”
89
 Prior 
to the Alabama claims, relations between the United States and Great 
Britain had been at their lowest point since the War of 1812.
90
  
Ill feelings had extended to popular sentiment in the United States as 
well. The American jurist John Bassett Moore noted a “deep and pent-up 
feeling of national injury [among] the mass of the people of the United 
States.”
91
 The arbitration occasioned the end of nearly a century of 
                                                                                                             
 83. COOK, supra note 20, at 241. 
 84. See id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. 
 87. Id. Cook estimates, however, that the United States, starved of foreign capital, 
needed Great Britain in an economic sense and stood to suffer a greater investment loss in 
case of war. Id. He estimates financial considerations hampered the American negotiators 
more than their counterparts. Id. 
 88. MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 652–53; HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW 
SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 216 (1927) (noting the arbitration was 
“the first instance of settling a dispute which raised high national feeling on both sides”).  
 89. HACKETT, supra note 18, at 376 (quoting 3 JOHN MORLEY, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 
EWERT GLADSTONE 413 (1903)).  
 90. MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 495. 
 91. Bingham, supra note 12, at 2 (quoting MOORE 1898, supra note 28, at 495). An 
inflammatory Anglophobic speech by the Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner whipped 
up antagonism and advocated an outrageous escalation of reparation demands including 
cession of Canada to the United States. CHARLES SUMNER, THE ALABAMA CLAIMS, SPEECH 
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intermittent war between the U.S. and U.K. and the beginning of decades of 
“close and successful Anglo-American cooperation.”
92
 
Adulations aside, it is worth entertaining the argument by at least one 
modern estimate that the Treaty of Washington and the Alabama decision 
did not fulfill their lofty mandate as legal precedent.
93
 The Treaty and 
arbitration certainly did not usher an international legal revolution of the 
sort hoped for by international law and arbitral enthusiasts of the day.
94
 The 
critical assessment is likely accurate when considered from the perspective 
of international arbitration as a pervasive means of peaceful settlement of 
disputes between powerful States. The critique does not account, however, 
for the extensive and enduring precedents set for due diligence specifically. 
The parties’ commitment to due diligence as a standard for their future and 
relations, as well as their call for the community of States to do similarly, 
stands as a prominent portent of future resorts to due diligence as a means 
of settling differences borne out in the work of States, publicists, and 
courts. 
The work of the Alabama tribunal quickly found significant support from 
domestic courts and, later, international courts. In 1887, the U.S. Supreme 
Court heard a challenge to a federal law prohibiting counterfeits of foreign 
government-issued notes, bonds, and securities in United States v. Arjona.
95
 
Although the defendant demurred on an indictment for possession of 
engraved plates capable of producing bank notes of “the state of Bolivar. . . 
[in] the United States of Columbia [sic],” he challenged the sufficiency of 
the indictment, arguing inter alia, the statutes exceeded Congress’s power 
to “define and punish . . . offences against the law of nations.”
96
 Upholding 
the statute, the Court turned to de Vattel’s Law of Nations and easily found 
support for both a specific international law prohibition on condoning or 
tolerating counterfeiters as well as a general international law duty of 
diligence to cease and redress harm to other States.
97
 The Court observed, 
                                                                                                             
OF THE HONOURABLE CHARLES SUMNER, DELIVERED IN EXECUTIVE SESSION OF THE UNITED 
STATES SENATE 19 (London, Savill, Edwards & Co. 1869). In the speech’s aftermath, an 
American consul reported from London widespread fear of war with the United States. See 
COOK, supra note 20, at 84 (citing Letter from Freeman H. Morse to William Pitt Fessenden, 
May 17, 1869, in FESSENDEN PAPERS (1908)). 
 92. Bingham, supra note 12, at 1 (citing ROY JENKINS, GLADSTONE 359 (1995)).  
 93. COOK, supra note 20, at 244. 
 94. Id. 
 95. 120 U.S. 479, 481–82 (1887). 
 96. Id. at 482, 484; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 97. Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484 (quoting EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 108 
(Joseph Chitty trans., 7th ed. 1849) (1760)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
662 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:645 
 
 
“The law of nations requires every national government to use ‘due 
diligence’ to prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to 
another nation with which it is at peace, or to the people thereof.”
98
 A 
breach of due diligence, the Court noted, “may not, perhaps, furnish 




Although under altered nomenclature, other States also eagerly codified 
notions of due diligence identified in the Alabama claims into early 
twentieth century multilateral treaties. For example, as part of the 1907 
Hague Peace Conference effort to convert burgeoning customs and usages 
in the international law of conflict management to treaty form, States 
addressed the law of maritime neutrality.
100
 Conflicts including the 
Spanish-American War, the Anglo-Boer War, and most immediately the 
Russo-Japanese War, resurrected questions concerning the extent and 
nature of duties of neutral States.
101
 The rules of the Treaty of Washington 
figured prominently in Hague Peace Conference debates on the subject.
102
 
Despite its earlier reticence, Great Britain fully reproduced the Treaty of 
Washington’s due diligence rules in the draft rules it submitted to the 
Conference.
103
 Noting some “obscurity” associated with the phrase due 
diligence, State delegates at The Hague substituted descriptive passages 
indicating a neutral State is “bound to employ the means at its disposal” and 
to “employ the same vigilance” in its international legal duties into the 
treaty.
104
 But both the rule and spirit of due diligence described in the 
Treaty of Washington and the Alabama decision were fully incorporated by 
The Hague Conference’s work.
105
 
Criticizing the Treaty of Washington and the Alabama arbitration as 
inconsequential also disregards weighty acknowledgments of due diligence 
as a principle and baseline rule of international law by publicists. Prominent 
publicists soon confirmed the concept of due diligence as an aspect of 
                                                                                                             
 98. Id. at 484. 
 99. Id. at 487. 
 100. See generally A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (1909).  
 101. See id. at 458. 
 102. See id. at 458–59. A questionnaire disseminated to the participating States and used 
to survey States’ initial views included copies of the rules of the Treaty of Washington. Id. 
 103. See id. at 465. 
 104. See id. (citing M. Renault, Projet d’une Convention Concernant les Droits et les 
Devoirs des Puissances Neutres en cas de Guerre Maritime, in 1 DEUXIÈME CONFÉRENCE 
INTERNATIONALE DE LA PAIX 295, 302 (1907)); see also Convention Concerning the Rights 
and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War art. 8, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2415. 
 105. See HIGGINS, supra note 100, at 387, 459, 464–65. 
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general international law. In 1905, Professor John B. Moore’s survey of 
State practice in international law offered firm support for the role of due 
diligence between States to address transboundary harm.
106
 He curated a 
succession of communications from various U.S. State Department officials 
reciting obligations of diligence owed by foreign States.
107
 A representative 
U.S. communication asserted a State was liable, “not only for any injury 
done by it, or with its permission . . . but for any such injury which by the 
exercise of reasonable care it could have averted.”
108
  
German jurist Lassa Oppenheim similarly acknowledged “international 
delinquency,” including acts of “culpable negligence” resulting in injury to 
another State, as a matter of general international law.
109
 Addressing the 
context of neutrality specifically, he concluded responsibility attached to a 
neutral State for injury to a belligerent State “as he could by due diligence 
have prevented, and which by culpable negligence he failed to prevent.”
110
 
Oppenheim quibbled with the precise formulation of duty articulated by the 
Alabama tribunal. Although he surmised that the Alabama tribunal’s 
formulation of the due diligence obligation was not part of the “universal 
rules of International Law,” he based that rejection specifically on its 
conclusion that due diligence involved weighing risks of injury to other 
States and the cost of action by the neutral.
111
 He ultimately concluded due 
diligence was reflected in general international law principles but merely 




For his part, Hersch Lauterpacht, a judge on the International Court of 
Justice, later characterized the Alabama tribunal’s notion of due diligence 
as imported from private law concepts. But he strongly supported their 
inclusion in general international law.
113
 The Alabama parties’ arguments, 
he noted, drew heavily on references to negligence in Roman and 
                                                                                                             
 106. See MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 791. 
 107. It is worth acknowledging that Moore’s assessments of international law were 
influenced heavily by his personal involvement in the practices of the U.S. State 
Department. See W. Michael Reisman, Lassa Oppenheim’s Nine Lives, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 
255, 256 (1994). 
 108. MOORE 1906, supra note 32, at 791 (citing Report of Francis Wharton, Solicitor of 
U.S. Dep’t of State, to Mr. Scruggs, Minister to Colombia (May 19, 1885)). 
 109. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE § 156 (Ronald F. Roxburgh 
ed., 3d ed. 1920).  
 110. 2 id. § 363 (2d ed. 1912).  
 111. Id. § 335. 
 112. Id. § 363. 
 113. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 88, at 219. 
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continental law as applied by domestic courts in private disputes.
114
 
Lauterpacht enthusiastically reconciled the Alabama tribunal’s notion of 
due diligence with settled objective standards of reasonable behavior by 
emphasizing the tribunal’s consideration of a “reasonable estimate on the 




Due diligence soon found support at the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) as well in the Corfu Channel case. In October 1946, two British Navy 
destroyers lawfully present in Albanian territorial waters struck hidden 
mines.
116
 After its claims stalled at the United Nations Security Council, the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) filed at the ICJ, alleging Albania had, inter alia, 
failed its duty to warn the ships of the mines in breach of treaty law and 
“general principles of international law.”
117
 After concluding Albania must 
have been aware of the mines, the Court affirmed the second U.K. claim, 
reciting, “every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be 
used for acts contrary to the rights of other States.”
118
 The Court’s 
endorsement of due diligence has been criticized as obiter dictum.
119
 Yet 
the observation does not seem an entirely inappropriate statement of law in 
the case when viewed as an expression of an underlying principle operating 
contemporaneously with a narrower rule for decision and made in direct 
response to a State litigant’s claim. Further, the Court held that the 1907 
Hague Convention VIII—the primary source of the U.K. treaty claim—
applied only during war and was not relevant to the case in a formal 
sense.
120
 As a result, the U.K. resort to the international law principle of due 
diligence seems justified. Nor was Albania a State party to the Hague 
Convention, surely explaining, if not excusing, the Court’s resort to the 
ambiguity of a by-then widely accepted principle over sector specific rules 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. The passages Lauterpacht cites for this proposition are available in a compilation 
of diplomatic papers on the Treaty of Washington. TREATY OF WASHINGTON PAPERS, supra 
note 22, at 64–68. 
 115. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 88, at 218. 
 116. Memorial of United Kingdom, Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. Pleadings 
19, 20–21 (Sept. 30, 1947). 
 117. Id. at 21. 
 118. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9).  
 119. See, e.g., Jörg Schildknecht, Belligerent Rights and Obligations in International 
Straits, in OPERATIONAL LAW IN INTERNATIONAL STRAITS AND CURRENT MARITIME SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 67, 78 (Jörg Schildknecht et al. eds., 2018); Greg Lynham, The Sic Utere 
Principle as Customary International Law: A Case of Wishful Thinking?, 2 JAMES COOK U. 
L. REV. 172, 184 (1995).  
 120. Corfu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 22.  
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relating to mines at sea.
121
 Even Judge Azevedo’s dissenting opinion 
agreed: the U.K. pleadings expressly invoked general principles of 
international law, clearly inviting the Court to rule in that respect.
122
 
In sum, the Treaty of Washington and the resulting Alabama claims 
decision illustrate that nineteenth-century U.S. and British foreign relations 
practices clearly acknowledged a duty of due diligence owed to and from 
other States as a matter of general international law. These early 
expressions emerged earliest in contexts of dispute settlement, particularly 
arising with respect to duties of neutrality such as the Jay Treaty and the 
Treaty of Washington, and by analogy in the Caroline correspondence. But 
they found clearest expression in the Treaty of Washington and at States’ 
positions at later treaty conferences. The U.S. and other States’ motives for 
conceding duties of diligence were varied but found form in binding legal 
terms, confirmed by a high-profile international treaty conference. Due 
diligence proved particularly useful in contexts such as those involving the 
Alabama and the Caroline where private parties were the proximate source 
of harm or in the Corfu Channel case, where the true source of harm could 
not be discerned. Due diligence operated as a convenient middle ground, 
permitting an offending State to disclaim attribution of harm while 
conceding an omission to the satisfaction of an injured State. Publicists and 
international tribunals soon seized on these concessions of sovereignty to 
law both as effective tools of peaceful settlements of disputes and also as 
doctrinal aspects of States’ general international legal obligations toward 
one another. 
B. The Trail Smelter Arbitration 
Established in 1896 in British Columbia, Canada along the Columbia 
River, the Trail smelter processed locally mined ore to produce zinc and 
lead.
123
 Originally built under U.S. auspices, the smelter was acquired in 
1906 by the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada 
(Consolidated), a subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway.
124
 
Consolidated grew the facility into the largest and best equipped smelter in 
                                                                                                             
 121. See id.  
 122. Id. at 84 (Azevedo, J., dissenting); see Memorial of United Kingdom, supra note 
116, at 21. 
 123. See R.S. DEAN & R.E. SWAIN, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT SUBMITTED TO 
THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL 6–7 (1944).  
 124. Kenneth B. Hoffman, State Responsibility in International Law and Transboundary 
Pollution Injuries, 25 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 509, 521 (1976) (stating the Canadian Pacific 
Railway was “the most powerful commercial activity in the Dominion”). 
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 By 1927, construction of twin 400-foot exhaust stacks 
further increased the smelter’s production capacity.
126
  
The Trail smelter sat approximately seven miles from Canada’s border 
with the United States (eleven miles by the course of the Columbia 
River).
127
 Winds in the region generally moved southwest along the river 
valley.
128
 On the U.S. side, the downwind region was devoted chiefly to 
agriculture and logging.
129
 Several small towns in the state of Washington 
sat within fifty miles of the Trail smelter.
130
 A U.S.-owned copper smelter 
had operated in the U.S. town closest to the border but was dismantled by 
1921.
131
 However, sulfur dioxide recorders detected strong accumulations 
even after the U.S. smelter closed.
132
 Complaints by landowners and 
farmers of crop and timber damage mounted through the 1920s. They 
alleged the increased height of the Trail smelter’s new stacks widened the 
downwind area affected, including U.S. territory.
133
 Smoke from the 
smelter was reportedly visible as far as thirty miles downwind.
134
 
In late 1927, after Consolidated had sporadically concluded private 
damages settlements with several landowners in Washington state, the U.S. 
government proposed the issue be dealt with diplomatically.
135
 Negotiations 
                                                                                                             
 125. Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1917 (Convention of Ottawa Tribunal 
1938 & 1941); see also Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can., 
Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. Pleadings 3, 3 (May 3, 1936). 
 126. Alfred P. Rubin, Pollution by Analogy: The Trail Smelter Arbitration, 50 OR. L. 
REV. 259, 260 (1971). 
 127. See Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can., supra note 
125, at 3. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.  
 130. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1913–14.  
 131. See Statement of Facts Submitted by the Agent for the Gov’t of Can., supra note 
125, at 3 (describing the Breen Copper Smelter at Northport, Washington).  
 132. See id. at 14. 
 133. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1917.  
 134. D.H. Dinwoodie, The Politics of International Pollution Control: The Trail Smelter 
Case, 27 INT’L J. 219, 221 (1972). 
 135. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1918; Letter from W.R. Castle, U.S. Sec’y of State, to 
William Phillips, U.S. Minister in Can. (Dec. 20, 1927), https://history.state.gov/ 
historicaldocuments/frus1928v02/d36. Commentators have remarked that the arbitration 
reflected not only a surprising result in international law but also a peculiar conversion of 
essentially private parties’ disputes, more suited to private domestic litigation, into a matter 
of international law for a transnational tribunal. See, e.g., Martijn van de Kerkof, The Trail 
Smelter Case Re-examined: Examining the Development of National Procedural 
Mechanisms to Resolve a Trail Smelter Type Dispute, 27 MERKOURIOS-UTRECHT J. INT’L & 
EUR. L. 68, 69–70 (2011). 
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quickly stalled and by July 1928, the United States and Canada referred the 
dispute to the standing International Joint Commission, created previously 
to address border-related issues.
136
 After collecting evidence in the affected 
region, the Commission issued a non-binding report dated February 28, 
1931. The Commission unanimously recommended Canada pay the United 
States $350,000 (U.S.) in damages.
137
  
Initial U.S. government enthusiasm for the Commission’s 
recommendation soon waned.
138
 Affected towns and farms in Washington 
State received the Commission’s report poorly, deeming reparations 
inadequate and promises to mitigate future pollution unreliable.
139
 The 
Commission had limited its recommendation to damage inflicted prior to 
1932 and had surmised pollution would soon cease by the end of 1931.
140
 
The landowners’ skepticism proved warranted; extensive pollution 
persisted from 1932 at least through 1937.
141
 
After intense diplomatic wrangling, Canada and the United States finally 
agreed to resolve the dispute through binding international arbitration, 
                                                                                                             
 136. The Commission was drawn under the auspices of a preexisting treaty between 
Canada and the United States. See Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, Gr. Brit.-U.S., art. IX, 
Jan. 11, 1909, 36 Stat. 2448. 
 137. Rep. and Recommendations of the Int’l Joint Comm’n Established by the Treaty 
Concluded Between the U.S. & Can. on 11 Jan. 1909, Signed at Toronto on 28 Feb. 1931, 29 
R.I.A.A. 365, 368. 
 138. Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 227–28 (citing Memorandum of Stimson’s Press 
Conference, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 5, 1931)). Professor Dinwoodie attributes initial U.S. 
support to President Herbert Hoover and Secretary of State Henry Stimson’s ambitions for 
international law as a means for securing international peace. Id. 
 139. Hoffman, supra note 124, at 515. 
 140. The General Manager of the smelter indicated that imminent installation of sulfuric 
acid units would significantly reduce the amount of sulfur emissions. Trail Smelter, 3 
R.I.A.A. at 1919. 
 141. Letter from Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Sec’y of State, to Pierre de L. Boal, U.S. Chargé 
in Canada (Feb. 10, 1933), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1933v02/d37. 
President Roosevelt suggested the United States and Canada submit the dispute to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, or as he called it, “the World Court at [T]he 
Hague.” Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the U.S., to William Phillips, U.S. 
Under Sec’y of State (Dec. 6, 1934), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934 
v01/d719. The U.S. Under Secretary of State, William Phillips, raised the possibility of 
international litigation at the PCIJ in a discussion with Canadian representatives. 
Memorandum by William Phillips, U.S. Under Sec’y of State (Dec. 13, 1934), 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d720. Canada did not respond 
favorably. Id. 
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memorializing their agreement in a bilateral treaty.
142
 Under the treaty, 
Canada agreed in advance to pay the United States $350,000 for all damage 
prior to January 1932.
143
 The remainder of the treaty outlined procedures 
for the arbitration of damages from 1932 forward. The treaty framed four 
questions, including the legal questions of Canadian liability for further 
damages and whether Canada owed a duty to cease the operations of the 
Trail smelter.
144
 The parties’ choice of law incorporated U.S. law and 
practice, “International Law and Practice,” and, in a seeming nod to equity, 
consideration of “a solution just to all parties concerned.”
145
 Some sources 
trace the parties’ resort to U.S. law as an effort to simplify the tribunal’s 
effort to address the meaning and scope of the term “damage” during the 
arbitration.
146
 However, writing after the dispute, the Canadian Legal 
Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs explained the Canadian side 
regarded U.S. tort law as far more favorable to Consolidated and the 
Government of Canada. He indicated that incorporation of Canadian tort 
law would have been “disastrous to the Smelter and to the economy of an 
important part of British Columbia.”
147
 
The Trail Smelter tribunal, comprised of three members, including a 
member from each party and a neutral chairman,
148
 issued its decision in 
two phases beginning on April 16, 1938.
149
 In light of the treaty’s 
concession of Canadian indemnity for damages prior to 1932, the arbitral 
tribunal limited its consideration to liability and damage from 1932 
forward.
150
 At the outset of its decision, the tribunal noted the difficulty, 
even the impossibility, of determining the precise amount of economic 
damage caused by the Trail smelter.
151
 Turning to U.S. tort law, including 
U.S. Supreme Court opinions, the tribunal determined that an 
                                                                                                             
 142. Convention for Settlement of the Damages Resulting from Operation of Smelter at 
Trail, British Columbia, Can.-U.S., Apr. 15, 1935, 49 Stat. 3245 [hereinafter Can.-U.S. 
Smelter Convention]. 
 143. Id. art. I. 
 144. Id. art. III. 
 145. Id. art. IV. 
 146. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 126, at 263. 
 147. John E. Read, The Trail Smelter Dispute, 1 CAN. Y.B. INT’L L. 213, 227 (1963); see 
also Rubin, supra note 126, at 263. 
 148. Can.-U.S. Smelter Convention, supra note 142, art. II. The Belgian jurist Jan Fans 
Hostie of Belgium served as Chairman. See Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 
1911 (Convention of Ottawa Tribunal 1938 & 1941). 
 149. Trail Smelter, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1905. 
 150. Id. at 1920. 
 151. See id.  
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approximation would be legally sufficient to avoid “a perversion of 
fundamental principles of justice.”
152
 On this basis, the tribunal moved to 
the question of causation.  
In its submissions, the Canadian government insisted the Trail smelter 
caused no damage after January 1, 1932.
153
 Readings from sulfur dioxide 
detectors and measurements of prevailing upper air currents along the 
Columbia River valley ultimately convinced the tribunal otherwise.
154
 
Inspections identified an area of damage from the Trail smelter extending 
approximately six miles into U.S. territory.
155
 The tribunal turned again to 
U.S. tort law to determine indemnity amounts for various categories of 
damage.
156
 Although it rejected or declined to address several U.S. claims, 
including “damages in respect of the wrong done the United States in 
violation of sovereignty,” the tribunal awarded an additional $78,000 for 




The tribunal then considered the legal questions of whether Canada must 
cease further damage by the smelter and what measures must be adopted. 
On the former issue, and in its most important finding as a matter of 
international law, the tribunal determined Canada owed a duty to refrain 
from permitting future damage.
158
 To be clear, the tribunal did not attribute 
pollution from the Trail smelter to the Government of Canada. Rather the 
decision faulted Canada’s omission or failure to cease, as territorial 
sovereign, particulate emissions into the United States.  
The international legal support for this determination was unclear. The 
1938 tribunal decision cited no legal authority for the question of a 
Canadian due diligence in this respect. On the issue of future measures of 
prevention, the tribunal delayed, requesting further information on available 
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. (quoting Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 
563 (1931)). 
 153. Id. at 1922. 
 154. Curiously, the tribunal rejected a theory presented by witnesses from both parties 
that surface winds, rather than upper air currents, were responsible for carrying smelter 
emissions from the smelter to the affected areas of the United States. Id. at 1922–23. 
 155. Id. at 1924. 
 156. Id. at 1925, 1928–29 (first citing Ralston v. United Verde Copper Co., 37 F.2d 180, 
183–84 (D. Ariz. 1929); and then citing 3 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE 
MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 937a (9th ed. 1920)). 
 157. Id. at 1932–33. The tribunal did not rule on the U.S. sovereignty claim after 
determining it was not anticipated in the scope the Convention. Id. at 1932. 
 158. Id. at 1934. 
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 The tribunal did, however, order installation of detection 
equipment at the Trail smelter to record emissions and to report back to the 
tribunal pending resolution of the preceding technical questions.
160
 The 
tribunal also capped emissions to levels it determined would not result in 
further damage to U.S. territory.
161
 
In 1941, after receiving updated data from the polluted region, the 
tribunal issued its final decision. A U.S. petition to revisit and recalculate 
the damages awarded in the 1938 decision led the tribunal to consider again 
the question of choice of law it had evaded in its prior decision.
162
 The 
tribunal rejected the U.S. petition, determining that the 1938 award 
amounted to res judicata as a matter of international law.
163
 The tribunal 
conceded that it had applied national law on some questions, as anticipated 
by the Convention that formed it.
164
 However, it emphasized an 
international tribunal could not “depart from the rules of international law 
in favor of divergent rules of national law unless, in refusing to do so, it 
would undoubtedly go counter to the expressed intention of the treaties 
whereupon its powers are based.”
165
 The tribunal noted the Convention 
limited application of U.S. law to “cognate” questions and reserved the 
main legal issues, or as the tribunal termed them “general questions of law,” 
to resolution by international law.
166
 
Returning to the international legal question of a Canadian duty to cease 
further damage, the tribunal’s 1941 decision again noted debate regarding 
whether these questions should be addressed under U.S. tort law or 
international law. The tribunal resolved the question by noting sufficient 
conformity of U.S. law with general international law on the subject of 
cross-border harm.
167
 In particular, the tribunal cited ongoing work on State 
responsibility, stating, “A State owes at all times a duty to protect other 
States against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction.”
168
 
The tribunal also cited the Alabama arbitration and other resorts to a 
                                                                                                             
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 1934–35. 
 161. Id. at 1936. 
 162. Id. at 1948. 
 163. Id. at 1952. 
 164. See id. at 1949–50. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at 1950. 
 167. Id. at 1963. 
 168. Id. (quoting CLYDE EAGLETON, RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
80 (1928)). 
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diligence principle between States, noting Canada had not questioned any 
such precedent at any stage of the proceeding.
169
  
The only serious question concerning the state of international law, the 
tribunal noted, was what constituted an injury for purposes of the due 
diligence principle.
170
 On this question the tribunal, as it had previously 
done in calculating damages, turned to U.S. national law.
171
 On these bases, 
the tribunal held that both U.S. law and principles of international law 
identified “serious consequence . . . established by clear and convincing 
evidence” as the relevant injury threshold for purposes of diligence.
172
  
The tribunal then announced its formulation of due diligence, indicating 
“no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another.”
173
 
Applying the U.S. and international standards to ongoing and predicted 
emissions by the smelter, the tribunal held, “the Dominion of Canada is 
responsible in international law for the conduct of the Trail Smelter.”
174
 
Accordingly, the tribunal devised a series of detailed operating conditions 
and regulations for its continued operation estimated to keep harm below 
the threshold required as a matter of international diligence.
175
 
Like the Alabama arbitral decision, the Trail Smelter decision attracted 
significant private commentary and produced a lasting and influential legal 
legacy. An early scholarly—though it must be emphasized, neither 
detached nor neutral—treatment of the Trail Smelter decision characterized 
the case as based on private nuisance rather than the classic fare of 
international law.
176
 International law, it was estimated, operated 
exclusively with respect to inter-State conduct and duties.
177
 The critique 
argued the decision only overcame these difficulties by “transmuting the 
claims by individuals against the Trail Smelter into claims sounding in 
                                                                                                             
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 1964–65 (surveying U.S. Supreme Court cases on air and water pollution 
between states). 
 172. Id. at 1965. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 1974–78. The capital cost of the tribunal’s mitigation regime reportedly ran to 
$20 million. Read, supra note 147, at 221. 
 176. See Read, supra note 147, at 222. Read, a former Justice of the International Court 
of Justice, may not have provided an entirely objective analysis in his article. He had served 
as Legal Adviser to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada for the duration of the Trail 
Smelter dispute. See id. at 213, 225. 
 177. See id. at 223. 
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international tort by the United States against Canada.”
178
 In this respect, 
the critique claimed the decision represented a departure from, rather than 
an application of, the usual convention for international legal claims.
179
  
The same account also suggested that benevolence on the part of Canada 
rather than correct application of international law explained the arbitral 
result. Neither of the prime ministers that held office during the dispute 
approached the negotiations with the United States as “horse-trading” or 
zero-sum prospects.
180
 Both Canadian leaders reportedly instructed their 
representatives to pursue an outcome that would profit both sides.
181
 The 
dispute also coincided with a reduction in Canada’s imperial ties to the 
United Kingdom, perhaps reflecting a turn toward closer relations with the 
United States.
182
 The Canadians’ concessions have also been explained as 
inducements for the United States to reduce or eliminate trade tariffs.
183
 By 
this explanation, the Convention that established the arbitral tribunal 
reflected a combination of Canadian goodwill and perceived opportunity as 
much as, or more than, prevailing international law.
184
  
A later academic examination of the decision also criticized the 
tribunal’s resort to international law as both selective and overreaching.
185
 
According to Professor Rubin, the Trail Smelter tribunal exceeded the 
parties’ mandate by resorting to international law to resolve questions 
answerable under U.S. law, such as whether its 1938 decision amounted to 
res judicata.
186
 Examining the travaux that produced the parties’ 
instructions to the tribunal on law, Professor Rubin argued the United States 
and Canada had determined there was “not much international law available 
dealing with international nuisance.”
187
 He explained that the need to 
supplement international law with domestic precedent was essential to 
providing the tribunal an effective rule for decision and was one of the few 
                                                                                                             
 178. Id.  
 179. See id. at 225. Others have questioned the decision’s precedential value despite its 
prominent place in the legal canon. Karin Michelson, Rereading Trail Smelter, 31 CAN. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 219, 219–20 (1993) (regarding the decision as “more an object of reverence than a 
subject of analysis”). 
 180. Read, supra note 147, at 225. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Dinwoodie, supra note 134, at 224. 
 183. Id. at 230. 
 184. See Read, supra note 147, at 225. 
 185. See generally Rubin, supra note 126. 
 186. Id. at 262–63. 
 187. Id. at 263 (quoting Read, supra note 147, at 227). 
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points on which the United States and Canada agreed.
188
 He further 
emphasized both sides reportedly entered the Convention negotiations 
“determined to avoid the possibility of finding a non liquet.”
189
 Thus, the 
tribunal’s unequivocal resort to international law, particularly to announce 
Canada’s duty to refrain from permitting damage, Rubin argued, 
represented both a dramatic departure from the parties’ intention to form a 
tribunal of limited jurisdiction and an unwarranted assumption of the duties 
of an international court.
190
  
Professor Rubin was similarly unimpressed by the tribunal’s substantive 
interpretations of international law. He accused the tribunal of “applying 
United States constitutional law precedents to the international law field by 
analogy.”
191
 Professor Rubin’s critique should not, however, be overstated. 
His dissatisfaction with the tribunal’s alleged interpretive overreach applied 
specifically to the questions of recovery of damages and the question of air 
pollution between sovereigns rather than to the general issue of due 
diligence between States.
192
 His critique is better understood as 
dissatisfaction with the tribunal’s resolution of cognate legal questions 
relating to context, application, damage thresholds, and remedies rather 
than with the foundational question of international responsibility for harm 
or an obligation of due diligence between States. 
Most academic attention to the Trail Smelter decision, however, 
investigates its status as a basis for international environmental law, 
specifically whether harm to the natural environment is cognizable in 
international law.
193
 The tribunal’s veiled, 1941 observations on the general 
international law duty of due diligence are often overlooked. Along with the 
                                                                                                             
 188. Id. 
 189. Read, supra note 147, at 227. Non liquet refers to judicial notice of an absence of 
law or failure to identify a rule of decision. See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet, OXFORD 
PUB. INT’L L., https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-97801 
99231690-e1669 (last visited Apr. 24, 2021). 
 190. Rubin, supra note 126, at 264. Professor Rubin observed, “[T]he tribunal seems to 
have acted as an authoritative arbiter of international law, notwithstanding the more 
restrictive language of the compromis.” Id. at 268. 
 191. Id. at 268. 
 192. See id. at 266–68. 
 193. Hoffman, supra note 124, at 509 (judging the Trail Smelter decision, “the most 
widely quoted arbitral authority in the area of international pollution” (citing Samuel A. 
Bleicher, An Overview of International Environmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 25 
(1972))). 
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Corfu Channel judgment and the Lake Lanoux arbitration,
194
 Trail Smelter 
has been characterized as a “disjointed trilogy” of international 
environmental law.
195
 Dismissive analyses note that only the latter 
concerned cross-border pollution lying clearly in international 
environmental law.
196
 The Trail Smelter tribunal’s decision has been 
explained as peculiar to its circumstances and therefore of limited 
precedential value, an inexorably contextualized decision.
197
 The source of 
damage was indisputable, the case involved significant economic interests 
of both sides, each faced similar risk of liability as both a potential polluter 
and victim, and the States in question enjoyed a history of cooperation as 
evidenced by the preexisting Boundary Water treaty.
198
 Absent any such 
condition, it is argued, neither side would have committed the question of 
liability to a mechanism of international law.
199
 
While perhaps effective to critique environmental obligations, it must be 
conceded each decision of the Corfu-Trail-Lanoux trilogy expresses clear 
international law support for the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non 
laeda or sic utero tuo, a command to use property so as not to harm 
another.
200
 Whatever allegations might attach to the Trail Smelter 
arbitration with respect to innovating international environmental law, the 
episode reflects both the tribunal and States’ parties’ sound confirmation of 
a general notion of due diligence to cease harm. In fact, the nascent or even 
non-existent precedent for recognition of environmental claims in Trail 
Smelter bolsters the independent and freestanding character of the due 
diligence obligation. That is, had international law unequivocally included a 
duty to prevent environmental harm, the Trail Smelter decision might be 
dismissed as a mere elaboration of a context-specific duty of diligence. But 
                                                                                                             
 194. See generally Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Fr.-Spain 
Arb. Trib. 1957); Brunson MacChesney, Judicial Decisions, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 156, 156–71 
(1959). 
 195. Michelson, supra note 179, at 221. 
 196. See id. at 222–23. Professor Brownlie referred to the Trail Smelter decision as 
“overworked.” Ian Brownlie, A Survey of International Customary Rules of Environmental 
Protection, 13 NAT. RES. J. 179, 180 (1973). 
 197. Michelson, supra note 179, at 230–31 (observing that under misguided political 
interpretations Trail Smelter “dwindles into insignificance, an object of little more than 
historical interest”). 
 198. Id. at 227–29. 
 199. See id. at 229–30. 
 200. The Corfu Channel Court’s reference to an obligation not to allow territory to be 
used to harm the rights of other States has been equated with the sic utero tuo principle. See 
id. at 221. 
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rather than a secondary duty with respect to environmental obligations, the 
parties’ arguments and concessions and the tribunal’s ruling on due 
diligence reflect application of a default or baseline duty of due diligence 
irrespective of particular context or setting. 
Assessing the legal significance of the decision, parallels between the 
Alabama claims arbitration decision and Trail Smelter are noteworthy. Both 
arbitrations addressed harm to another State not directly attributable to the 
offending State as such. Neither decision attributed the proximate cause of 
harm to the territorial sovereign of its source; in both cases, the harm 
alleged was directly traceable to acts of private parties. In both arbitrations, 
the offending State initially asserted, but ultimately abandoned, arguments 
that a State cannot be held responsible under international law for harm 
caused by the acts of private parties.
201
 In this sense, both arbitrations 
addressed omissions on the part of the offending State rather than positive 
acts. Both the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations saw the United States 
advocate due diligence as both a principle and baseline rule of general 
international law, as well as a rule of conduct applicable to a specific 
context of international interaction, neutrality in armed conflict and 
environmental law respectively. The members of both arbitral tribunals 
accepted these arguments with respect to a general international law duty 
on the part of States to cease harm emanating from their borders into the 
territory of another sovereign. Finally, both arbitrations successfully 
resolved highly contentious disputes between otherwise close allies. 
III. Present Perspectives 
Based in significant part on the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitral 
decisions and their progeny, current international law sources consistently 
recognize due diligence as a fundamental principle. Meanwhile, private 
commentators and organizations cite due diligence as relevant to emerging 
issues in international relations, such as harmful transboundary cyber 
activities. Two recent ICJ judgments, based in significant part on due 
diligence as a rule of international environmental law, have confirmed in 
broad terms States’ general duty to cease harm that emanates from their 
territory. Additionally, the International Law Association has formed two 
study groups to address due diligence specifically. States and private 
                                                                                                             
 201. See, e.g., Letter from R.B. Bennett, Canadian Sec’y of State for External Affs., to 
Warren D. Robbins, U.S. Minister in Can. (Feb. 17, 1934), https://history.state.gov/ 
historicaldocuments/frus1934v01/d694 (asserting “the alleged facts complained of were civil 
and not international wrongs”). 
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parties, through international organizations and, with respect to the former 
in increasingly common expressions of opinio juris, offer increasingly clear 
positions on the fit between cyberspace and international law generally as 
well as specific notions of due diligence in cyber contexts. Their work 
highlights a number of doctrinal considerations worthy of attention from the 
United States and other States. 
A. Due Diligence in International Law 
Two recent ICJ judgments discuss the principle of due diligence in some 
detail. Both cases arose in the context of international environmental law 
but lend insight into the application of due diligence as a principle under 
general international law. Both cases unquestioningly embrace and apply 
due diligence as both a principle of international law and a regime-specific 
rule. 
On May 4, 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings against Uruguay at the 
ICJ, alleging breaches the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay.
202
 
Argentina’s claims concerned Uruguay’s approval of construction of two 
pulp mills along the River Uruguay.
203
 Argentina argued the mills required 
notification and consultation under Articles 7 to 12 of the treaty.
204
 
Specifically, Argentina alleged a failure of due diligence with respect to 
Uruguay’s construction and operation of the mills.
205
 Construction had 
caused and would continue to cause significant damage to the water quality 
of the river, resulting in significant transboundary harm to Argentina.
206
 
Argentina argued,  
Uruguay should have taken three steps to comply with the 
requirements of due diligence and its obligation to prevent 
damage to the environment, namely: (1) establish the initial 
quality of the waters receiving the pollutants, (2) identify as 
clearly as possible the volume and characteristics of the 
pollutants which the mill will have to discharge into the river and 
(3) establish that the waters receiving the anticipated polluting 
                                                                                                             
 202. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 1 (Apr. 20). 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. ¶ 67. 
 205. Memorial of Argentina, Pulp Mills on River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2007 I.C.J. 
Pleadings 1, ¶ 5.3 (Jan. 15, 2007). 
 206. Id. 
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discharges are able to receive them and then disperse them in 
such a way as to prevent any harm.
207
 
The Court responded favorably to Argentina’s legal formulation, 
invoking the Corfu Channel case definition of due diligence while also 
endorsing a duty of prevention.
208
 The Court observed in relevant part, 
“[T]he principle of prevention, as a customary rule has its origins in the due 
diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is ‘every State’s 
obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to 
the rights of other States.’”
209
 The Court then translated the due diligence 
principle of general international law into a specific rule applied to the 
context of international environmental law. Referring to its decision in the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion, the 
Court stated: 
A State is thus obliged to use all the means at its disposal in 
order to avoid activities which take place in its territory, or in 
any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State. This Court has established that 
this obligation “is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.”
210
 
Discerning further nuance to the rule of due diligence in international 
environmental law, the Court observed: 
Moreover, due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and 
prevention which it implies, would not be considered to have 
been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the 
régime of the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake 




                                                                                                             
 207. Id. ¶ 5.31. 
 208. Pulp Mills on River Uruguay, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 101. Though the Court engaged in a 
detailed review of the environmental effects alleged in the case, in the end, it determined that 
“there is no conclusive evidence in the record to show that Uruguay has not acted with the 
requisite degree of due diligence.” Id. ¶ 265. 
 209. Id. ¶ 101 (quoting Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, at 22 
(Apr. 9)). 
 210. Id. (quoting Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 
1996 I.C.J. Reports 226, ¶ 29 (July 8)). 
 211. Id. ¶ 204. 
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The same year the ICJ issued its Pulp Mills judgment, the Court began 
proceedings in the Border Area case that returned to the principle of due 
diligence. Like the Pulp Mills case, this case arose in the context of 
international environmental law, but again presented the Court an 
opportunity to address due diligence as a general international law 
principle.
212
 The Border Area case arose from Costa Rican allegations that 
Nicaragua had occupied Costa Rican territory and impermissibly carried 
out dredging operations in a channel of the San Juan River.
213
 Costa Rica 
alleged the operations were “in violation of [Nicaragua’s] international 
obligations.”
214
 After Costa Rica filed its case in 2011, Nicaragua instituted 
proceedings against Costa Rica, alleging “violations of Nicaraguan 
sovereignty and major environmental damages on its territory” by means of 
road construction beside the San Juan River along the border between the 
two countries.
215




In a 2015 judgment, the Border Area Court reiterated its conclusions of 
law from the Pulp Mills case, restating the due diligence obligation and 
reemphasizing the preventative aspects of diligence with respect to 
environmental harm. The Court stated, in relevant part: 
to fulfil its obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing 
significant transboundary environmental harm, a State must, 
before embarking on an activity having the potential adversely to 
affect the environment of another State, ascertain if there is a 
risk of significant transboundary harm, which would trigger the 
requirement to carry out an environmental impact assessment.
217
 
The Court then reemphasized its decision concerning the application of the 
due diligence principle to international environmental law, concluding: 
if the environmental impact assessment confirms that there is a 
risk of significant transboundary harm, a State planning an 
activity that carries such a risk is required, in order to fulfil its 
obligation to exercise due diligence in preventing significant 
                                                                                                             
 212. See Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in Border Area (Costa Rica 
v. Nicar.) and Construction of Road in Costa Rica Along San Juan River (Nicar. v. Costa 
Rica), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶ 104 (Dec. 16). 
 213. Id. ¶ 1. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. ¶ 9. 
 216. Id. ¶¶ 101–103. 
 217. Id. ¶ 104. 
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transboundary harm, to notify, and consult with, the potentially 
affected State in good faith, where that is necessary to determine 
the appropriate measures to prevent or mitigate that risk.
218
 
Two important points concerning the present state of due diligence can 
be drawn from these ICJ cases. First, the filings of the several States party 
to the litigation evince clear support for the notion of due diligence both in 
a general international legal sense and in specific contexts of international 
relations involving transboundary environmental harm. No State party to 
either case unequivocally rejected due diligence as either an international 
legal principle or as a regime-specific rule of conduct in its submissions to 
the Court. Second, the Court not only reaffirmed its earlier Corfu Channel 
observations concerning a general duty of due diligence, it also discerned 
refinements to the duty, most obviously in the form of a duty to prevent 
harm. Though the Court’s conclusions most clearly apply to a context-
specific application of the due diligence principle, as discussed immediately 
below, they may provide interesting considerations for the further 
development of due diligence in other areas, such as transboundary cyber 
activities. 
Private commentators have seized similar observations. On the issue of 
prevention, the International Law Commission proposed draft articles on 
“Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities” in 2001.
219
 
Article 3 states “The State of origin shall take all appropriate measures to 
prevent significant transboundary harm or at any event to minimize the risk 
thereof.”
220
 As noted in the Commission’s commentary to the Article, the 
focus of the articles and the duty they purport to assign “deals with the 
phase prior to the situation where significant harm or damage might 
actually occur.”
221
 Though focused largely on transboundary environmental 
harm, these draft articles would potentially impact a much broader set of 
activities if extrapolated to a general duty of due diligence. 
At the time of the Draft Articles’ referral to the UN General Assembly, 
many States commented on their virtue, some referring to them as reflective 
of customary international law.
222
 The United States, however, rejected that 
notion. In its statement, the United States commented: 
                                                                                                             
 218. Id. ¶ 168. 
 219. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10, at 146–48 (2001). 
 220. Id. at 153. 
 221. Id. at 148. 
 222. Press Release, Sixth Comm., Sixth Committee Hears of Proposed Treaty on 
Transboundary Harm Resulting from Hazardous Activities: Law Commission Chairman 
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We continue to believe it is most appropriate for the draft articles 
to be treated as non-binding standards to guide the conduct and 
practice of states, and for the work on prevention of 
transboundary harm to remain formulated as draft articles. 
Retaining the current, recommendatory form of these draft 
articles and principles increases the likelihood that they will gain 
widespread consideration and fulfill their intended purposes of 
providing a valuable resource for States in this area. With respect 
to this agenda item, the United States position has not changed 
since our last statement. 
As we have previously noted, both the draft articles and draft 
principles go beyond the present state of international law and 
practice, and are clearly innovative and aspirational in character 
rather than descriptive of current law or state practice.
223
 
The articles have never progressed beyond the “draft” stage, though they 
continue to be influential in State interactions, particularly with respect to 
international environmental law as discussed above. 
Meanwhile, in related private work and in response to growing academic 
and diplomatic attention to the principle of due diligence, the International 
Law Association (ILA) commissioned a study group “to consider the extent 
to which there is a commonality of understanding between the distinctive 
areas of international law in which the concept of due diligence is 
applied.”
224
 The group issued its First Report in 2014; a second study group 
revisited the issue in a 2016 Report.
225
 The First Report summarized the 
history and development of due diligence in international law “to stimulate 
further discussion” at a conference to develop a Second Report.
226
 The 
Second Report, informed by the background material collected by the First, 
employed a “thematic and analytical, rather than sectoral, approach” to due 
diligence.
227
 The study group concerned itself “less with how due diligence 
                                                                                                             
Sees Prevention as Primary Aim, with Likely Impact on International Environmental Rules, 
U.N. Press Release GA/L/3191 (Nov. 2, 2001). 
 223. David Bigge, Statement at the 74th General Assembly Sixth Committee Agenda Item 
81: Consideration of Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous 
Activities, U.S. MISSION TO THE U.N. (Oct. 22, 2019), https://usun.usmission.gov/statement-
at-the-74th-general-assembly-sixth-committee-agenda-item-81-consideration-of-prevention-
of-transboundary-harm-from-hazardous-activities/. 
 224. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 225. Id.; ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 226. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
 227. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. 
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is used in specific fields and more with broader, analytical questions, 
concerning what functions due diligence serves, and why it is employed as a 
standard of conduct in many and varied areas of international law.”
228
 
Several useful considerations emerge from the ILA reports. First, the 
Group conceded that “[p]recisely how the due diligence standard is applied 
is still subject to considerable discussion and debate.”
229
 Both Reports 
concluded that, though the existence of the principle receives wide 
acceptance and general support, the details of the application of the 
principle vary widely. In fact, the Reports describe due diligence as an 
“open-ended standard or principle”
230
 and as a “flexible concept, the 
content of which varied depending on the circumstances of the case.”
231
  
These observations led the Second Report to assert, “[t]his broad 
principle of due diligence can be understood as underlying more specific 
rules of due diligence. Hence, it can be viewed as a default standard that is 
triggered in operation if no more specific elaboration of due diligence or 
stricter standard is in existence.”
232
 The Second Report described due 
diligence as an “expansive, sectorally-specific yet overarching concept of 
increasingly [sic] relevance in international law.”
233
 In other words, due 
diligence is an accepted general baseline standard of care in States’ dealings 
with one another that has also developed in specific sectors—such as 
international environmental law—into more well-defined “specific primary 
rules.”
234
 The ILA Group’s conclusions make an important point with 
respect to emerging domains of State interaction such as cyberspace, 
suggesting that cyber activities are governed by the more general principle 
of due diligence, but that no sector-specific rules have yet been agreed upon 
by States. 
A second important point from the Reports concerns the prevailing 
default or baseline standard of care attendant to due diligence. The Reports 
note general agreement that the principle of due diligence operates as a 
standard of conduct and not of result or outcomes.
235
 And in qualitative 
                                                                                                             
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 7. 
 230. Id. at 3. 
 231. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. 
 232. ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 6. 
 233. Id. at 47. 
 234. Id. at 6. 
 235. ILA 2014 REPORT, supra note 6, at 17; ILA 2016 REPORT, supra note 6, at 2. See 
generally Antal Berkes, The Standard of ‘Due Diligence’ as a Result of Interchange 
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terms, the Second Report identified the standard of conduct by States as one 
of “reasonableness,” consistent with conceptions of due diligence dating 
back at least to the Alabama arbitration and publicists’ reactions thereto.
236
 
Further, the Report found application of a State’s reasonableness “will tend 
to be assessed on an ex post facto basis to determine compliance and 
responsibility.”
237
 The retroactive nature of the principle led the Report to 
question the ability of States to “ascertain clearly, and in advance, that they 




A final important point from the ILA Reports with respect to the 
impending application of due diligence to cyber activities concerns 
application of the principle of due diligence to non-state actors. The Reports 
fell short of applying due diligence per se to non-state actors but noted a 
duty on the part of States “to prevent and punish the unlawful acts of armed 




While the work of the ILA Study Groups identified important issues 
related to the principle of due diligence, the Second Report admitted 
“further work on due diligence [was] deemed appropriate.”
240
 The ILA 
Study Group recommended the ILA “undertake further study and . . . 
propose a resolution identifying the material factors and underlying 
principles helpful in the identification and operation of due diligence as a 
standard of conduct in international law.”
241
 All things considered, the ILA 
reports reflect a careful and conservative effort to restate the principle of 
due diligence. The ILA Study Groups appear to have resisted the temptation 
to develop the principle themselves or to subsume a lawmaking function. 
But, as the Reports concede, the present state of the due diligence principle 
remains underdeveloped in many respects and subject to substantial 
contextual variance. 
The uncertain state of due diligence identified by the ILA is confirmed 
by the present U.S. position—or perhaps more descriptively, the lack of a 
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 237. Id. at 7. 
 238. Id. 
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position—with respect to due diligence. There does not appear to be a 
current or updated official position from the U.S. government on the 
international law principle of due diligence. This is true despite the two 
previously analyzed historical incidents wherein the United States clearly 
advocated the principle and prevailed on the merits of its application. 
Silence on the part of the U.S. government might be taken to indicate the 
United States has not changed its views from the positions taken in the 
Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations, but even that much cannot be 
confirmed with certainty. Lack of support for the principle of due diligence 
when the opportunity presented itself, such as in the United Nations Group 
of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) discussed below, has led to assumed 
skepticism in some quarters.
242
  
ICJ recognition of due diligence as both a general principle and a sector-
specific duty and the confirmation of this approach by the ILA study groups 
confirm the dual incarnations of due diligence. Hesitance on the part of the 
United States to endorse a specific rule in the context of the UN GGE on 
cyber activities, in contrast with prior advocacy of the general principle in 
the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations, may suggest a similar 
bifurcation with respect to due diligence. However, the ubiquity of cyber 
activities and their potential to inflict significant transboundary harm may 
encourage States to look to sector-specific rule applications of due diligence 
as analogies in the cyber context. 
B. International Law and Cyberspace 
Renewed interest in the principle of due diligence, as evidenced by State 
filings at the ICJ and the ILA’s study groups, has coincided with an 
escalation in the number of transnational cyber incidents resulting in 
significant harm. Over the past decade in particular, the number and 
severity of cyber operations resulting in damage have dramatically 
increased.
243
 Many of these cyber activities have been attributed to States or 
State proxies,
244
 causing some to argue for clear statements on the 
applicability of international law to cyber activities.
245
 
                                                                                                             
 242. See, e.g., HOLLIS, supra note 3, at 21. 
 243. How Cyber Attacks Have Grown in Scale over the Past 10 Years, SBS NEWS (June 
28, 2017), https://www.sbs.com.au/news/how-cyber-attacks-have-grown-in-scale-over-the-
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 244. Julie Hirschfield Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Million 
People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/us/office-of-
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In response to the dramatic increase in cyber activities with 
transboundary impacts, States convened a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) through the United Nations General Assembly to discuss 
“Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the 
Context of International Security.”
246
 The process began in the late 1990s 
and has perhaps enjoyed pride of place as the leading forum for States to 
debate and develop or confirm international regulations and norms of 
conduct in cyberspace.
247
 At present, the UN GGE has convened five times. 
The third meeting, in 2013, generated a consensus report, as did the fourth 
meeting in 2015. The most recently completed UN GGE meeting, in 2017, 
however, was unable to achieve consensus on a final report.
248
 Yet the 
contents of the 2013 and 2015 reports still stand as prominent, if 
ambiguous, expressions of States’ present views on international law and 
cyberspace. They are worth examining briefly for clues to States’ 
                                                                                                             
of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), 
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interference-election-trump-clinton.html (reviewing Russia’s known meddling in U.S. 
elections). 
 245. See, e.g., Catherine Lotrionte, State Sovereignty and Self-Defense in Cyberspace: A 
Normative Framework for Balancing Legal Rights, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 825, 831–32 
(2012). 
 246. Anders Henriksen, The End of the Road for the UN GGE Process: The Future 
Regulation of Cyberspace, 5 J. CYBERSECURITY, no. 1, 2019, at 1–2. 
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 248. Arun M. Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in Cyberspace 
Doomed As Well?, LAWFARE: BLOG (July 4, 2017, 1:51 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ 
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perspectives on the fit between international law and cyberspace generally, 
as well as for clues to views on due diligence. 
The 2012-2013 iteration of the UN GGE, consisting of fifteen States,
249
 
issued a landmark consensus report at the conclusion of its meetings.
250
 The 
report recognized, “[t]here has been a noticeable increase in risk in recent 
years as [Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs)] are used 
for crime and the conduct of disruptive activities.”
251
 The Report concluded, 
“[i]nternational cooperation is essential to reduce risk and enhance 
security.”
252
 Participating States agreed to three important statements 
concerning international law and cyber activities.  
The first deals with the application of international law. The Report 
states “[i]nternational law, and in particular the Charter of the United 
Nations, is applicable and is essential to maintaining peace and stability and 
promoting an open, secure, peaceful and accessible ICT environment.”
253
 
Though useful, the UN GGE statement is watered down by comparison 
with a statement offered by the United States during deliberations. In its 
submission to the Group, the United States argued that “existing 
international law serves as the appropriate framework applicable to activity 
in cyberspace in a variety of contexts, including in connection with 
hostilities.”
254
 The U.S. submission offered specifics regarding how both 
the ius ad bellum (the right to resort to armed conflict) and the ius in bello 
(the conduct of the parties engaged in armed conflict) applied to cyber 
actions,
255
 arguing, “the difficulty of reaching a definitive legal conclusion 
or consensus among States on when and under what circumstances a hostile 
cyber action would constitute an armed attack does not automatically 
                                                                                                             
 249. The States involved were Argentina, Australia, Belarus, Canada, China, Egypt, 
Estonia, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. Rep. of 
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Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, transmitted by Letter dated 7 
June 2013 from the Chair of the Grp. of Governmental Experts on Devs. in the Field of Info. 
and Telecomm. in the Context of Int’l Sec., U.N. Doc. A/68/98, annex (June 24, 2013) 
[hereinafter 2013 UN GGE Report]. 
 250. See id. ¶ 34. 
 251. Id. ¶ 1. 
 252. Id. ¶ 2. 
 253. Id. ¶ 19. 
 254. U.S. Delegation Remarks at U.N. General Assembly Sixty-Seventh Session, in 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 600 (Carrie Lyn D. Guymon 
ed., 2012) [hereinafter U.S. Delegation Remarks]. 
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suggest that we need an entirely new legal framework specific to 
cyberspace.”
256
 The view that the existing legal paradigm is applicable, 
sufficient, and can be used by analogy in dealing with the “challenges” 




The second important UN GGE statement concerning international law 
and cyber activities indicates “State sovereignty and international norms 
and principles that flow from sovereignty apply to State conduct of ICT-
related activities, and to their jurisdiction over ICT infrastructure within 
their territory.”
258
 Though there is general agreement that the international 
law principle of sovereignty applies to state-sponsored cyber activities, how 





 While the U.S. position on 
sovereignty in cyberspace is not entirely clear,
261
 the U.S. submission to the 
2013 UN GGE stated simply, “State sovereignty, among other long-
standing international legal principles, must be taken into account in the 
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Paul C. Ney, Dep’t of Def. Gen. Counsel, Remarks at U.S. Cyber Command Legal 
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Finally, the 2013 UN GGE Report confirms, “States must meet their 
international obligations regarding internationally wrongful acts attributable 
to them. States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful 
acts. States should seek to ensure that their territories are not used by non-
State actors for unlawful use of ICTs.”
263
 The United States unequivocally 
supported this strong statement on the use of proxies. In its 2013 
submission, the United States identified the enticing nature of and 
increasing use of proxies by States.
264
 The United States argued that “a 
State is legally responsible for cyber activities undertaken through ‘proxy 




The consensus statements concerning the applicability of international 
law to cyber activities in the 2013 UN GGE Report are significant because 
they are the first multinational statements of their kind. They provide a vital 
starting point for the application of international law to cyber activities. 
However, they are almost as important for their lack of consensus on other 
fundamental issues, including some strongly advocated for by the United 
States such as the applicability of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to 
cyber operations during hostilities.
266
 Many of these issues were considered 
again when an expanded group of States met in 2015. 
The 2015 UN GGE expanded from fifteen States to twenty.
267
 Building 
on its predecessor, the 2015 Report added several key points. Two key 
points agreed upon by the 2015 group of States reflect directly on the 
application of international law to cyber activities. First, all participants 
agreed that “States should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for 
internationally wrongful acts using ICTs.”
268
 Second, the group agreed on a 
more detailed application of this obligation with respect to critical 
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 and cyber emergency response teams.
270
 This obligation to 
prevent transboundary harm, and its relation to the principle of due 
diligence, will be discussed more fully below. 
As with the 2013 Report, the 2015 Report called for future meetings, 
including “regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the 
auspices of the United Nations, as well as regular dialogue through 
bilateral, regional and multilateral forums and other international 
organizations.”
271
 The most recent meeting was similarly expected to issue 
a report but was unable to reach consensus and disbanded in June 2017.
272
 
It appears Cuba, China, and Russia finally refused to sign the proposed 
draft,
273
 at least in part based on the United States and others continuing 
desire to state that the LOAC regulated cyber activities in armed conflict.
274
 
A commentator observed: 
In reaction to the June 2017 UN GGE disappointment, the 
American representative noted that the US had come to the 
“unfortunate conclusion that those who are unwilling to affirm 
the applicability of these international legal rules and principles 
believe their states are free to act in or through cyberspace to 
achieve their political ends with no limit on their actions” and 
that this is “a dangerous and unsupportable view”. Although the 
US representative did not name states like China and Russia, the 
insinuation was quite clear. Frustration with what appears to be 
intentional obstruction by at least certain states was also 
noticeable in remarks delivered in the First Committee’s 
discussions of the lack of a fifth UN GGE consensus report in 
October 2017 by the German Representative.
275
 
After the failure of the 2017 GGE, commentators seemed skeptical that 
future meetings would occur.
276
 However, the UN GGE process has 
recently resumed, with twenty-five member States and a schedule to 
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complete their work in May 2021.
277
 In addition, the General Assembly also 
initiated an Open-Ended Working Group which is open to all Member 
States and which is charged with consulting industry, civil society, and 
academia.
278
 Despite the failure of the 2016-17 UN GGE, the General 
Assembly appears committed to continue pushing toward the development 
of norms and increased statements on practice to facilitate a clearer 
understanding of the application of international law to cyber activities. 
In addition to the United Nations GGE, other multinational 
organizations, and many States have separately expressed their views on the 
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 Despite the fact that many of these separate statements 
reinforce the application of international law to cyber activities, the 
breakdown of the UN GGE clearly indicates that this is not a consensus 
view. 
Meanwhile, simultaneous to the UN GGE process, private commentators 
increasingly offered views on the application of international law to States’ 
activities in cyberspace. In the aftermath of a 2007 cyber incident that 
crippled Estonian public and private cyber capabilities,
290
 the NATO 
Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence convened a group of 
experts
291
 to draft a manual applying the law of war to cyber operations. In 
2013, the group published the Tallinn Manual on the International Law 
Applicable to Cyber Warfare (The Tallinn Manual).
292
 In response to 
subsequent comments, a similar group of experts convened to study the 
operation of public international law generally to States’ cyber activities. In 
2017, the group published the Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law 
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Applicable to Cyber Operations (Tallinn Manual 2.0).
293
 Though merely 
the personal views of the respective groups of experts, both manuals (and 
particularly Tallinn Manual 2.0) benefitted from States’ and peer reviewers’ 
comments prior to publication.
294
 While in no sense sources of international 
law themselves, the manuals offer helpful baselines for States to consider 
the applicability of international law to cyber operations. 
In this vein, the work of Tallinn Manual 2.0 tracks the work by States at 
the GGE in many respects. Much like the UN GGE Groups, the Tallinn 
group had little difficulty agreeing that general international law, including 
both its guiding principles and rules of conduct, applied, if only by default, 
to States’ activities in cyberspace.
295
 As ever, the devil proved to be in the 
details. That is, precisely how the principles of rules of general international 
law would operate (so-called mixed questions of fact and law) and the 
extent to which any cyber-specific rules of conduct or understandings had 
developed repeatedly split the group into majority, minority factions and 
even further into isolated views of single members. Far from a failing of the 
group, this fragmentation merely reflected the simultaneous ambiguity 
attendant to many of the principles considered and the nascent condition of 
State practice in cyberspace. As much as anything, the manuals’ 
equivocations and fragmentation highlight opportunities for States to 
develop firmer notions of how, if at all, international law baselines should 
adjust in their application and operation in cyberspace. 
Despite the inability of the UN GGE and private commentators to 
produce a consensus statement with respect to operation of international 
law in all its aspects to cyber activities, the significant weight of evidence 
lies in favor of its application. Most States and commentators, both when 
acting alone and when acting with others, have accepted this view. It is also 
the predominant view among scholars and scholarly organizations. The 
question to be discussed below is how the specific international law 
principle of due diligence applies to cyber activities. 
C. Due Diligence in Cyberspace 
Recalling that the principle of due diligence requires States to not 
knowingly allow their territory be a source of transboundary harm, cyber 
activities over the past two decades have clearly implicated the principle of 
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 Having situated the principle of due diligence in 
international law and then reviewed the acceptance of international law as 
governing cyber operations, it is now important to analyze the international 
law principle of due diligence as applied to cyber operations. In light of the 
firm and broadly accepted historical roots of due diligence by States, courts, 
and commentators, along with the growing consensus that due diligence has 
expanded to include context or regime-specific nuances,
297
 the time is ripe 
to survey States’ and others’ views with respect to international cyber due 
diligence. Already, present perspectives include a menu of views. At one 
end of the spectrum, some are enthusiastic toward broadminded 
development of cyber-specific notions of due diligence. At the other end are 
skeptical or regressive approaches, which either reject cyber-specific 
applications or even advocate rollbacks of baseline due diligence as general 
international law. As ever, primacy belongs to the views of States in this 
respect. 
In 2015, the last report of the UN GGE adopted “recommendations for 
consideration by States for voluntary, non-binding norms, rules or 
principles of responsible behaviour of States aimed at promoting an open, 
secure, stable, accessible and peaceful ICT environment.”
298
 Among those 
“voluntary, non-binding” recommendations was the observation that “States 
should not knowingly allow their territory to be used for internationally 
wrongful acts using ICTs.”
299
 However, failure to secure consensus on the 
application of due diligence to cyber operations in 2017 seems less 
catastrophic given the other basic failures of agreement on other seemingly 
less controversial topics. Further, one might argue that the appearance of 
cyber due diligence in the 2015 Report at all—even as a recommendation 
for consideration—is still an acknowledgment that it is a point of discussion 
among States. It is, as yet, unclear whether the 2019 UN GGE will produce 
a consensus document and if such a document will include a statement on 
due diligence.  
The European Council (EC), through Josep Borrell, has also recently 
published a statement with respect to cyber due diligence and “malicious 
cyber activities exploiting the coronavirus pandemic.”
300
 In the statement, 
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the “European Union and its Member States call upon every country to 
exercise due diligence and take appropriate actions against actors 
conducting such activities from its territory, consistent with international 
law and the 2010, 2013 and 2015 consensus reports of the United Nations 
Groups of Governmental Experts.”
301
 The endorsement of cyber due 
diligence as a justification for “tak[ing] appropriate actions against actors 
conducting [malicious] activities” from within a State’s territory by the 




Meanwhile, a limited number of States has addressed cyber due diligence 
directly, providing additional clarity the UN GGE was unable to secure. 
Many of these statements were offered in response to inquiries posed by 
Professor Hollis under the auspices of the Organization of American States 
(OAS).
303
 For example, in response to the question, “Does due diligence 
qualify as a rule of international law that States must follow in exercising 
sovereignty over the information and communication technologies in their 
territory or under the control of their nationals?,” Chile, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, and Peru each agreed due diligence applied to cyber 
operations.
304
 According to Professor Hollis, “Bolivia offered a more 
equivocal response,” arguing “a State may not be held responsible for a 




By contrast, the United States did not respond to the question, leading 
Professor Hollis to argue that “prior public U.S. statements have not 
addressed the international legal status of due diligence directly. It is 
notable, however, that the United States has tended to describe any 
obligations to respond to requests for assistance in non-binding terms.”
306
 
Professor Hollis then concluded, “The lack of any public U.S. endorsement 
of due diligence as a legal rule in either the GGE context or elsewhere may 
be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal status.”
307
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States have offered comments outside the UN GGE, the EC, and the 
OAS. Estonia, for example, has argued that States must assume a certain 
level of responsibility:  
[S]tates have to make reasonable efforts to ensure that their 
territory is not used to adversely affect the rights of other states. 
They should strive to develop means to offer support when 
requested by the injured state in order to identify, attribute or 
investigate malicious cyber operations. This expectation depends 




France argued for a strong view of due diligence, positing:  
Under the due diligence obligation, States should ensure that 
their sovereign domain in cyberspace is not used to commit 
internationally unlawful acts. A State’s failure to comply with 
this obligation is not a ground for an exception to the prohibition 
of the use of force, contrary to the opinion of the majority of the 
Tallinn Manual Group of Experts.
309
 
The Netherlands, while acknowledging “not all countries agree that the due 
diligence principle constitutes an obligation in its own right under 
international law,”
310
 expressed the view that 
the due diligence principle requires that states take action in 
respect of cyber activities: 
- carried out by persons in their territory or where use is 
made of items or networks that are in their territory or 
which they otherwise control; 
- that violate a right of another state; and 
- whose existence they are, or should be, aware of.311 
On the other hand, despite allegations that non-state actors—as well as 
coordinated transnational cyber actors such as Anonymous
312
—have 
engaged in major cyber operations from within States such as the United 
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 and North Korea,
318
 none of 
these governments has clearly indicated a responsibility to exercise due 
diligence in order to prevent transboundary cyber harm originating from 
within its territory outside the UN GGE Reports. And no State has claimed 
that a host State violates its “cyber due diligence” obligation by failing to 
prevent such transboundary harm.
319
 
Thus, Professor Hollis was unable to find general acceptance of a cyber 
due diligence principle. He instead concluded “there are competing views 
on whether due diligence is a requirement of international law in 
cyberspace.”
320
 As yet, there is apparently no consensus on how the due 
diligence principle will apply in the sector-specific area of cyber operations, 
at least according to select States. Others take different views. 
The Tallinn group, for example, carefully considered the principle of due 
diligence and its application to cyber operations. The group acknowledged 
the UN GGE was unable to accept a rule applying due diligence to cyber 
operations but emphasized the participating States “do not definitively 
refute the existence of such a principle.”
321
 The Tallinn group noted, “the 
due diligence principle has long been reflected in jurisprudence [and] it is a 
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general principle that has been particularised in specialised regimes of 
international law.”
322
 Accordingly, the group confirmed two observations 
concerning due diligence. First the group agreed, “A State must exercise 
due diligence in not allowing its territory or cyber infrastructure under its 
governmental control, to be used for cyber operations that affect the rights 
of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.”
323
 
Commentary to this first observation clarified an “obligation of vigilance” 
rather than an “obligation of prevention.”
324
 Despite historical evidence to 
the contrary—including advocacy by States and findings of international 
tribunals such as in the Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations—the group 
discerned no duty to take preventive measures. The group stated that “this 
Rule is not to be interpreted as including a requirement of monitoring or 
taking other steps designed to alert authorities to misuse of cyber 
infrastructure located on the State’s territory.”
325
  
Second, the Tallinn group concluded the duty of due diligence as applied 
to a cyber context operates only with respect to “serious adverse 
consequences.”
326
 Though the exact meaning of that phrase is admittedly 
unsettled in international law, the group resisted calls to clarify the term 
beyond its present state.
327
 The group also acknowledged that the situation 
of a transit State—a State through which harm transited but did not 
originate—deserved specific analysis and provided additional commentary 
with respect to the situation.
328
 
Finally, the group discerned, “[k]nowledge is a constitutive element in 
the application” of due diligence to cyber operations.
329
 The group 
identified no State practice supporting any alteration from the baseline 
principle of due diligence with respect to the cyber context and knowledge. 
The group concluded, as the Court in Corfu Channel had, that requisite 
knowledge could be actual or constructive.
330
 In other words, for a State to 
have a due diligence obligation, it must have knowledge of the 
transboundary harm emanating from within its territory or from cyber 
infrastructure which the governmental controls. 
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The group achieved consensus with respect to still another limit on the 
due diligence principle in cyber operations. The group agreed, “The 
principle of due diligence requires a State to take all measures that are 
feasible in the circumstances to put an end to cyber operations that affect a 
right of, and produce serious adverse consequences for, other States.”
331
 In 
interpreting this rule, “[t]he Experts agreed that the territorial State must act 
to terminate the wrongful operation, but that it is at that State’s discretion to 
choose the means to comply with this Rule.”
332
 
All told, while the Tallinn group achieved consensus on an international 
law obligation of cyber due diligence, it recognized a more limited duty 
than that which has arguably developed in other sectors, such as 
international environmental law. The lack of a duty to prevent or even 
monitor, coupled with high threshold of harm and absolute requirement of 
knowledge, suggests a minimally intrusive notion of due diligence 
applicable to cyberspace. 
In addition to those States and collective private efforts convened by 
organizations mentioned above, individual commentators have variously 
advocated for the application of due diligence to cyber operations, while 
acknowledging States’ seeming skepticism of such an application.  
Professor Schmitt, who led both Tallinn manual projects, wrote 
separately in support of due diligence during his work on Tallinn Manual 
2.0. He identified a pressing dilemma States face with respect to the due 
diligence principle between “the burden they fear the principle may 
impose” and their desire to “ensure that other states take every feasible step 
to put an end to harmful cyber activities launched from—or through—their 
own territory.”
333
 He argued due diligence is a “general principle” of 
international law, meaning that “the presumption is that the principle 
applies unless state practice or opinio juris excludes it.”
334
 Professor 
Schmitt posited that, if applied correctly, States need not worry about due 
diligence overreach.
335
 Rather, he argued, “the obligation is highly sensitive 
to the capabilities of the states concerned,” thus relieving the expectation of 
an onerous application.
336
 Further, the application of due diligence is 
bounded by what is reasonable under the circumstances, meaning that “if 
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the burden on the territorial state in taking remedial actions is so onerous as 
to be unreasonable under the circumstances, inaction will not constitute a 
breach.”
337
 Professor Schmitt also echoed the Tallinn Manual 2.0 
conclusion that due diligence applies only with respect to “ongoing cyber 
activities that are generating serious adverse effects in another country,” 
and when the State has knowledge of the actions.
338
 In summary, Professor 
Schmitt argued that the “right of sovereignty and the corresponding duty of 
due diligence must be in equilibrium.”
339
 Recognizing this equilibrium, 
Schmitt concludes that: 
A state need not undertake onerous measures to prevent its cyber 
infrastructure from being used maliciously, such as monitoring 
all cyber activity. And only when a state learns of ongoing 
activities—such as when the victim state brings it to light—does 
the duty mature. Most importantly, the principle of sovereign 
equality means that other states bear the same obligation. Thus, 
they have a legal incentive to ensure that harmful cyber 
operations are not conducted from their territories. If they fail to 
comply with their due diligence responsibility, the injured state 
may respond either directly against them or indirectly by 
conducting operations against the non-state actors involved.
340
 
Where Professor Schmitt offers a limited notion of due diligence, 
Professors Shackelford, Russell, and Kuehn depart and advocate “a 
proactive regime that takes into account the common but differentiated 
responsibilities of various stakeholders in cyberspace.”
341
 They translate 
due diligence requirements into specific State responsibilities, comparing 
the American, German, and Chinese “domestic policy regimes including 
laws, frameworks, . . . and initiatives that incentivize private actors under 
their jurisdiction to behave in accordance with prevailing legal 
obligations.”
342
 The authors divide their analysis “into three general activity 
categories: (1) Establish and Maintain, (2) Control and Enforce, and (3) 
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 They then rate each country on their success in 
these areas.
344
 Ultimately, the authors attempt “to provide illustrative 
examples of various domestic responsibilities and approaches to meeting 
them in the due diligence context.”
345
 
The authors then examine how those domestic regulations translate into 
the private sector in the United States, with respect to encouraging private 
sector cybersecurity due diligence. They conclude, “Despite some progress, 
there is still a long way to go.”
346
 A proposed solution is their “polycentric 
approach,” which “recognizes that diverse organizations working at 
multiple levels can create different types of policies that can increase levels 
of cooperation and compliance, enhancing ‘flexibility across issues and 
adaptability over time.’”
347
 Application of due diligence in this polycentric 
approach, they argue, will allow the international community to “mitigate 
the risk of cyber war by laying the groundwork for a positive cyber peace 
that respects human rights, spreads Internet access along with best 
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Robert Kolb, Reflections on Due Diligence Duties and Cyberspace, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L 
L. 113, 127 (2015) (raising several questions about the application of due diligence to cyber 
activities but concluding nonetheless that “[d]ue diligence is a concept flexible enough to 
accommodate such particular needs”); Joanna Kulesza, State Responsibility for Cyber-
Attacks on International Peace and Security, 29 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 139, 151 (2009) 
(“[T]here is a need for an international consensus on the criteria which have to be fulfilled 
by a state in order to avoid international responsibility for failing to show due diligence in 
protecting other sovereigns from cyber-attacks.”); Ian Yuying Liu, State Responsibility and 
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While Professor Schmitt clearly, and understandably, advocated the 
Tallinn Manual 2.0 approach to due diligence, a critique of this approach 
alleged several flaws in the analysis.
349
 The critique accepted “[d]ue 
diligence is customary international law,”
350
 but argued the Tallinn group 
should have accepted a “theory of aggregation when determining the 
character of the triggering harm fails to cover Botnet operations.”
351
 The 
critique argued the nature of botnet operations, in particular, would rarely 
reach the threshold of harm required by the due diligence principle, leaving 
the victim State without a claim and the generating State without an 
obligation.
352
 The critique also claimed the Tallinn Manual 2.0 rejection of 
preventative measures with respect to the exercise of due diligence allows 
States to “implement[] a policy of plausible deniability when it comes to 
cyber operations in their territory.”
353
 The critique predicted States would 
adopt the theory of aggregation of attacks and take an obligation to 
preventatively gather knowledge about cyber activities in a State’s 
territory.
354
 This knowledge would then permit the due diligence principle 
to become “an indispensable tool in maintaining international peace and 
security” with respect to cyber operations.
355
  
Alongside support for cyber due diligence as an international legal 
approach to transboundary cyber harms, there is limited skepticism 
concerning State acceptance of the duty of due diligence and its application 
to cyber activities by States. For example, Professor Schmitt himself 
acknowledges “nascent state opposition” to the application of a general rule 
of cyber due diligence.
356
 Similarly, Professor Hollis argues that “[t]he lack 
of any public U.S. endorsement of due diligence as a legal rule in either the 
GGE context or elsewhere may be indicative of U.S. doubts as to its legal 
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 Others have also used caution with respect to various 
applications of cyber due diligence. Professors Reinisch and Beham 
conclude, “the obligations of transit States remain largely unclear.”
358
  
Finally, in a previous work, we raised a warning concerning the potential 
unanticipated consequences of a strong due diligence obligation that may 
lead to failures equating to a violation of international law, allowing a resort 
to countermeasures as a remedy. We observed previously, 
[B]y presenting more opportunities for more States to allege 
more breaches of international law, due diligence potentially 
increases the frequency of States’ resort to countermeasures and 
their accompanying potentially destabilizing effects. Before fully 
embracing a more refined notion of cyber due diligence and the 
consequent increased opportunities to allege breach, States are 
well advised to consider carefully both practical limitations of 




In summary, it appears there is widespread acceptance of due diligence 
as a fundamental principle that may facilitate the resolution of emerging 
issues, such as harmful transboundary cyber activities. The advocacy and 
outcomes of the U.S. claims in Alabama and Trail Smelter suggest a 
diplomatic custom of support as well. More recently, the ICJ has 
unabashedly issued decisions based on the specific application of a general 
due diligence principle, while the International Law Commission and 
International Law Association have both produced documents which also 
endorse such a position.  
While much of the stronger language has reflected the sector specific 
area of international environmental law, these works and statements by 
States have confirmed in broad terms States’ general duty to cease harm 
that emanates from their territory. However, the sector specific application 
of due diligence to cyber activities is less clear. The inability of the UN 
GGE to make a strong statement in this area continues to feed skepticism 
sufficient to overcome the embrace of the principle by a majority of 
academics. Statements such as the recent EC statement will continue to 
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increase the pressure on States, including the United States, to accept the 
notion of cyber due diligence. 
IV. Potential Future Perspectives 
Review of past and present perspectives suggests due diligence has lived 
two distinct, though interconnected lives in international law. First, it is 
abundantly clear due diligence has been a widely recognized and applied 
principle of international law since the late nineteenth century or earlier.
360
 
In the absence of a fully developed regime of tort, as found in municipal 
systems of law, States have resorted to due diligence to express general 
expectations of reasonable care and regard for harms to sovereignty 
between States.
361
 More than an abstract norm or guiding sentiment, the 
principle of due diligence has enjoyed doctrinal acknowledgement from 
tribunals, publicists, and States.
362
 Indeed, due diligence is viewed as a 
general, though ambiguously framed, duty to cease harm that emanates 
from sovereign territory and causes serious adverse consequences in the 
territory of another State.
363
 The precise standards of conduct and result that 
follow from the principle and its doctrine remain unclear. But at a 
minimum, responsibility for serious harm from activity in a State’s territory 




Second, the same sources have simultaneously acknowledged and have 
gradually refined regime-specific notions of due diligence that operate as or 
supplement rules of conduct. Early periods featured obligations of due 
diligence by States specific to neutrality and to maritime affairs.
365
 Later, 
other specific fields and conditions of international relations including 
armed conflict, the natural environment, outer space, human rights, and 
perhaps now global health have developed or are developing an 
increasingly refined doctrinal conceptions of due diligence through treaty, 
custom, and, in a subsidiary sense, through decisions of tribunals.
366
 Many 
specialized international regimes now include detailed standards of conduct 
or results, thresholds of harm, and obligations of reparation as matters of 
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 As the preceding Part illustrated, these regime-specific 
notions of due diligence feature extensively in treaties, international 
litigation, and private sector work on international law and point to the 
likely path of development of due diligence in emerging domains of 
international relations. 
Third, although distinct in important doctrinal respects, the two lives of 
due diligence have been interrelated. Each has clearly influenced or 
inspired developments and refinements in the other. Acknowledgement and 
development of the principle of due diligence has inspired or spawned 
regime-specific notions of due diligence. In nearly every context of 
international relations, States and tribunals have resorted to the principle of 
due diligence as a baseline or starting point to discern or develop further 
rules of conduct and result arising from State failures with respect to a wide 
range of harm.
368
 Likewise, regime-specific doctrines have influenced or 
purport to influence the doctrinal content of the principle of due 
diligence.
369
 The quite detailed standards of conduct or result, thresholds of 
harm, and reparation schemes developed for specific domains of 
international relations have been proposed for incorporation into the general 
scheme of international due diligence with varying degrees of success.
370
 
Thus, it is clear due diligence in each incarnation, and through the 
interaction of these incarnations, plays an increasingly important role in the 
international legal regulation of State interactions. In light of these two 
lives, their future importance, and in recognition of positive history with 
due diligence broadly, the United States may wish to revisit its position on 
both due diligence and cyber due diligence. At the very least, the United 
States should consider embracing a neutral view on both applications, but 
more positively embracing a tailored approach to both due diligence and 
cyber due diligence.  
As the previous Part illustrated, it is difficult to identify a current U.S. 
view on the principle of due diligence. Present U.S. practice generally 
avoids the question of due diligence altogether or frames comments on due 
diligence as reflections on desirable norms of State behavior rather than 
reflections on a legally binding duty.
371
 To date, the most unequivocal U.S. 
statements on the principle are found in submissions to late nineteenth and 
mid-twentieth century international arbitrations in which the United States 
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was a victim State.
372
 The extent to which these statements curtail or should 
curtail a future U.S. position deserves consideration.  
As a preliminary matter, U.S. legal policymakers may wish to refine and 
express U.S. views on the status of due diligence as a principle of 
international law. Historical U.S. legal statements could guide the limits of 
a plausible and coherent U.S. future perspective on due diligence. At a 
minimum, the United States might publicly acknowledge its customary 
support for due diligence in its foreign relations and diplomatic practices. 
Additionally, favorable outcomes and practical diplomatic concerns seem to 
counsel in favor of maintaining a status quo U.S. approach to due diligence. 
Still, substantial doctrinal flexibility remains for U.S. legal policy to 
account for extant and anticipated demands of international relations. A 
U.S. statement on a principle of due diligence might admit its existence but 
simultaneously identify and advocate limits on doctrinal details, including a 
duty to prevent harm and on the threshold of harm itself. 
It is worth recalling the United States zealously embraced and advocated 
a general duty of diligence between States as a principle of international 
law at the Treaty of Washington negotiations with Great Britain, and in two 
legal episodes that preceded those negotiations.
373
 Recall, the United States 
aggressively advocated for and largely succeeded at codifying the principle 
of due diligence into the Treaty of Washington as both an ad hoc rule of 
adjudication and as a prospective limit on future relations with Great 
Britain and potentially with other States.
374
 Then, at all stages of the 
Alabama arbitration that followed—and in the face of British backpedaling 
on the principle—the United States maintained steadfast support for a 
general duty of due diligence between States.
375
 As related above, the 
Alabama tribunal clearly adopted the U.S. view to the substantial benefit of 
the United States and ultimately to its relations with Great Britain. 
More than sixty years later and on the eve of its emergence as a 
superpower, through a decades-long series of diplomatic negotiations and a 
protracted international legal arbitration with Canada, the United States 
similarly endorsed and advocated a general duty of due diligence in 
international law. From 1927 through 1941, the Trail Smelter episode 
provoked clear and unwavering U.S. assertions of a duty of diligence for 
Canada to cease emanation of privately generated transboundary harm as a 
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matter of international law.
376
 And like its predecessor, the Alabama 
tribunal, the Trail Smelter tribunal largely adopted U.S. arguments, again, 
to the substantial benefit of U.S. interests and, ultimately, to U.S.-Canada 
relations.  
Some commentators have cabined the Trail Smelter opinion’s legal 
outputs and precedential value, particularly its observations concerning due 
diligence, to the context of transboundary environmental pollution. It is 
true, at the time of Trail Smelter arbitration, litigation of transnational 
environmental harm was novel to international law. Yet a more adept 
reading of the Trail Smelter decision and of the involved States’ 
submissions to the tribunal restricts allegations of legal innovation to the 
arbitration’s and the parties’ application of due diligence rather than to the 
existence of a duty of due diligence. On the mixed question of fact and law 
regarding whether States owed a duty to cease environmental pollution by 
private parties’ operations within their territory, the tribunal and parties’ 
filings may have broken new ground. However, any regime-specific 
doctrines of due diligence that emerged from the Trail Smelter tribunal’s 
decision and the parties’ submissions surely reflect, in substantial part, 
application of the preexisting and general duty of due diligence offered by 
the United States at each stage of negotiation and arbitration and embraced 
by the tribunal—and for that matter by Canada—as a baseline principle of 
international law. 
As Professor Hollis has indicated, more recent U.S. perspectives on due 
diligence present a less clear case for a future perspective.
377
 But, on 
balance, U.S. practice seems to support recognition of due diligence as a 
principle of international law. In the face of consistent and repeated 
expressions of the principle in high-profile litigation at the ICJ, the United 
States has expressed no public or notorious objection to due diligence 
conceived broadly. From its very general confirmation of U.K. due 
diligence claims in the Corfu Channel case through its direct and 
unequivocal confirmation and application of the principle to modern 
contexts of State interaction, the ICJ has served up a consistent and 
progressively refined vision of the principle of due diligence to the 
international community. The United States has not expressed publicly any 
of the sort of criticism or censure of the Court that might be expected if due 
diligence were not in its view a principle of general international law.  
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Admittedly, judgments, even grossly incorrect ones, or statements of law 
by international tribunals do not require State rejoinders. And despite treaty 
provisions suggesting the contrary, there is strong evidence, also based in 
treaty, for a purely adjudicative rather than law-making understanding of 
international litigation.
378
 Yet, such persistent and prominent judicial 
confirmation of the principle of due diligence, such as those offered by ad 
hoc and standing tribunals, would seem to have provoked some adverse 
U.S. reaction if in fact the United States regarded them as made in error. 
Moreover, these tribunals’ judgments align closely with positions taken by 
the United States in its litigation over due diligence claims. These positions 
thus render the conclusion the United States has generally, though quietly, 
since the 1940s supported due diligence at least reasonable. Thus, although 
not entirely untenable, a U.S. legal position rejecting due diligence as a 
principle of international law would be extraordinarily difficult to peddle at 
this late stage of development. 
Beyond past or present U.S. legal positions, other practical 
considerations derived from U.S. experience with the principle of due 
diligence bear mention in the formation of a future U.S. perspective. First, 
on two legally historic occasions, embrace and assertion of due diligence 
served the United States extraordinarily well in its international relations. 
The Alabama and Trail Smelter arbitrations not only secured meaningful 
compensation from other States for harm to U.S. citizens, both episodes 
ended with significant vindications of U.S. foreign policy.
379
 The United 
States emerged from each episode as a State unwilling to compromise its 
citizens’ interests yet committed to peaceful and independent evaluation of 
its claims.
380
 Further, each episode played a significant part in securing a 
peaceful and prosperous future relationship with an important ally.  
In a related sense, both the Alabama and Trail Smelter results illustrate 
the role due diligence might play as a relief valve of sorts in international 
relations. The Alabama claims arose in the highly charged context of 
recognition of belligerency by Great Britain. Paired with this diplomatic 
and international legal insult, the harm resulting from British-built ships to 
U.S. merchant fleets nearly brought the parties to war.
381
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As related above, broader political and economic considerations perhaps 
best explain how the United States and Great Britain avoided war. Yet the 
nature of the due diligence principle as an internationally wrongful act may 
also have played a part in the peaceful and successful resolution of the 
Alabama claims. That is, casting British conduct as a failure of due 
diligence permitted the United States to raise the issue early, in a way, 
freezing the facts of the dispute and reducing the likelihood of escalatory 
exchanges of retorsions or even reprisals. 
Similarly, although damage from the Trail Smelter significantly soured 
U.S-Canada relations for more than a decade, the U.S. claims alleged a 
lapse of diligence.
382
 Arguably, it was an omission—rather than direct 
responsibility for or an affirmative act resulting in harm—which explains 
their successful and peaceful resolution. Again, the nature of the due 
diligence principle as an allegation of omission rather than of action or even 
of imputed responsibility may have played a part in the peaceful and 
successful resolution of the claims. 
Although developed as a facet of international legal responsibility 
between States, due diligence is peculiar in that it does not require that the 
harm involved be traced directly to or attributed to the offending State. Nor, 
for that matter, does due diligence operate as a theory of liability requiring a 
predicate or underlying international wrong; the lapse of diligence is itself a 
wrongful act.  
A breach of due diligence simply involves a failure on the part of the 
offending State to act reasonably to cease harm regardless of attribution and 
regardless of the wrongfulness of acts that caused harm. Fault and 
recompense in due diligence are not based on highly nefarious attributions 
or commissions of underlying internationally wrongful acts in every case as 
with other international causes of action. Rather they are based on mere 
omission or even oversight by the offending State.
383
  
In this sense, breaches of due diligence may reflect comparatively less 
damning or threatening delicts than other allegations in international law. 
Allegations grounded in due diligence permit both victim and offending 
States to address and resolve claims arising from harm somewhat indirectly. 
The victim State is able to assert and protect its interests against a peer 
international legal personality, while the offending State is able either to 
deny or at least elude direct responsibility for the harm, perhaps to save face 
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or satisfy domestic interests, while offering a de-escalatory concession of 
omission to the victim State.  
Although the apparently magnanimous concessions of both Great Britain 
and Canada respectively in the Alabama and Trail Smelter episodes have 
been explained by larger political and economic conditions, the 
comparatively benign brand of culpability associated with due diligence 
surely made magnanimity in these episodes all the more feasible than more 
direct or damning allegations of fault might have. These de-escalatory or 
face-saving experiences, associated at least in part with due diligence, 
might further counsel the United States not abandon support for the 
principle as a relief valve of this sort in international relations. 
Finally, if U.S. rejection of a principle of due diligence generally would 
be difficult, the United States might nonetheless tend to misgivings over 
evolving expressions of the principle through an updated expression on the 
subject. As noted previously, although legally distinct, the international law 
principle of due diligence and various regime-specific expressions of due 
diligence have experienced a developmental cross pollination of sorts.
384
 
Clearly the principle of due diligence has inspired and informed regime-
specific notions of the concept. Meanwhile, doctrinal elaborations 
originally developed for specific contexts of international interaction have 
found their way into academic, and even judicial, descriptions of the 
principle of due diligence. For instance, although the regime-specific notion 
of prevention of harm presents most clearly in international environmental 
law, it has featured in a number of prominent articulations of the general 
principle of due diligence. That is, accounts of the due diligence principle 
recite a general—as opposed to a merely regime-specific—duty on the part 
of States to prevent, rather than merely respond to and cease, transboundary 
harm. To preserve the traditional flexibility and adaptability of the principle 
of due diligence, the United States might reject refinements such as a duty 
of prevention or a lower threshold of harm reserving such questions for 
regime-specific incarnations of the principle. 
Given the two lives of due diligence discussed above, the U.S. 
determination on how to treat due diligence in the future is not necessarily 
dispositive of how it will treat cyber due diligence. While it would be 
legally inconsistent to reject a general principle of due diligence and 
embrace cyber due diligence, the same is not true if the United States 
decides to accept the general principle and reject the sector-specific 
application. It is not certain the United States will embrace cyber due 
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diligence as a matter of international law. The recent Cyber Solarium 
Report presented an opportunity to endorse due diligence as one method of 
placing legal responsibility upon violators who are attacking U.S. interests 
both at home and abroad but did not.
385
  
On the other hand, the U.S.’s historical advocacy of due diligence and 
the general trends among the international community toward a sector 
specific application of cyber due diligence should be sufficient to cause 
serious reflection on the part of the United States of potential benefits from 
endorsing such a view. In an age where harmful transboundary activities are 
increasing at an alarming rate, cyber due diligence offers one legal 
methodology to assign accountability and provide possible options for 
redress. 
Additionally, if the United States embraced a duty of cyber due 
diligence, many of the potential concerns with overreach would be 
minimized. Rejecting, as the Tallinn group did, the duty of prevention and 
monitoring would remove potential human rights concerns as well as limit 
the scope of the requirement to a much more plausible requirement. 
Further, by reinforcing the requirement for actual or constructive 
knowledge prior to the duty to take action and then limiting that action to 
what is feasible, the United States and other like-minded States can endorse 
a view of due diligence that provides a remedy to the increasing risks 
associated with transboundary cyber harm without creating a duty that is 
too onerous to apply or enforce. Such a tailored duty of cyber due diligence 
deserves not only consideration, but adoption by the United States and, 
indeed, the entire international community. 
V. Conclusion 
The idea that a State advocate and beneficiary of two of the earliest and 
most prominent due diligence claims in international law would abandon 
the principle involves no small irony. On two occasions in its international 
legal history, the United States championed due diligence to its great 
diplomatic advantage. Both episodes featured not only ardent U.S. resort to 
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international legal process and regulation but also illustrated the potential 
for international law to contribute to peaceful resolution of disputes. 
Greatly influenced by U.S. arguments and experience, a wide range of 
international law sources, including States, courts, and publicists has 
embraced two incarnations of due diligence. Due diligence clearly operates 
as a free-standing, baseline duty of conduct by States to cease serious ham 
that emanates from their territory. In the absence of more specific rules of 
conduct, this general incarnation of due diligence reflects a minimum 
standard of care in international relations. Separately, but similarly 
influenced by early U.S. diplomatic practice, due diligence has developed 
in sector-specific legal regimes as a rule of conduct and as a supplement to 
understandings of other duties. Legal regimes including neutrality, law of 
the sea, law of war, and, most notably of late, environmental law have 
developed increasingly refined notions and doctrines of due diligence to 
regulate State conduct in volatile domains of international relations. While 
the United States played an active role in the early development of both 
incarnations of due diligence, there are signs of U.S. reticence or even 
recalcitrance with respect to due diligence generally and as applied to 
emerging domains of such as cyberspace. 
A survey of past U.S. experience, growing international support, as well 
as the merits and limitations of due diligence itself, suggests the United 
States should adopt an active and clear legal policy toward both 
incarnations of due diligence. With respect to general or baseline due 
diligence, the United States might express support while emphasizing the 
doctrinal limits of international consensus. The United States might 
embrace core elements including a duty to cease known and serious adverse 
consequences while characterizing efforts to further refine duties of 
prevention or to lower thresholds of harm as unsupported by custom and 
practice. At the same time, the United States might clarify views on sector-
specific notions of due diligence, including cyberspace. A duty of due 
diligence in cyberspace offers significant potential to mitigate harm to 
critical information infrastructure. Yet the peculiar technical, economic, and 
diplomatic features of cyberspace suggest clear and perhaps idiosyncratic 
limits on how due diligence can and should operate in this unique realm. A 
clearly defined U.S. legal policy toward due diligence, accounting for U.S. 
diplomatic practice, intervening international legal developments, and the 
peculiarities of cyberspace as a domain of state interaction and competition 
will both support vital U.S. security interests and reassert influence on a 
critical component of the regulation of modern international relations. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/3
